Alta Wimmer for Herself, and for the Heirs of Lori K. Wimmer, Deceased, Plaintiff/Appellant, vs. Sunny Pandita, m.d. And David Scott Peterson, m.d., Defendants/Appellees by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) 
2014 
Alta Wimmer for Herself, and for the Heirs of Lori K. Wimmer, 
Deceased, Plaintiff/Appellant, vs. Sunny Pandita, m.d. And David 
Scott Peterson, m.d., Defendants/Appellees 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellant, Wimmer v. Pandita, Peterson, No. 20131144 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2014). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3565 
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with 





IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ALT A WIMMER for herself, and for the 
heirs of LORI K. WIMMER, deceased, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
SUNNY PANDITA, M.D. and DAVID 
SCOTT PETERSON, M.D., 
Defendants/ Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20131144-CA 
Oral Argument Requested 
Appeal from a Final Order of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Paul G. Maughan, District Court Judge, Presiding 
District Court Case No. 050910577 
Shawn Mcgarry (5217) 
Nan T. Bassett (8909) 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Counsel for Appellee Pandita 
Robert G. Wright (5363) 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
299 South Main Street, 15th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Counsel for Appellee Peterson 
Bruce M. Pritchett (6781) 
LARSON LAW 
922 West Baxter Drive, Suite 200 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
Clark Newhall (7091) 
LAW OFFICE OF CLARK NEWHALL 
57 West 200 South, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Counsel for Appellants 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COU:lTS 
OCT - 2 2014 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ALT A WIMMER for herself, and for the 
heirs of LORI K. WIMMER, deceased, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
SUNNY PANDITA, M.D. and DAVID 
SCOTT PETERSON, M.D., 
Defendants/ Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20131144-CA 
Oral Argument Requested 
Appeal from a Final Order of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Paul G. Maughan, District Court Judge, Presiding 
District Court Case No. 050910577 
Shawn Mcgarry (5217) 
Nan T. Bassett (8909) 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Counsel for Appellee Pandit a 
Robert G. Wright (5363) 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
299 South Main Street, 15th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Counsel for Appellee Peterson 
Bruce M. Pritchett (6781) 
LARSON LAW 
922 West Baxter Drive, Suite 200 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
Clark Newhall (7091) 
LAW OFFICE OF CLARK NEWHALL 
57 West 200 South, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Counsel for Appellants 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO APPEAL 
i, Plaintiffs/Appellants: Alta Wimmer, for herself and for the heirs of Lori K. Wimmer, 
deceased. 
Defendants/Appellees: Sunny Pandita, M.D. and David Scott Peterson, M.D. 
Page 2 of 63 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
List of All Parties to Appeal ................................................................................................ 2 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ 3 
Table of Authorities ............................................................................................................. 5 
<i> Jurisdictional Statement ...................................................................................................... 9 
Statement oflssues and Standards of Review ..................................................................... 9 
Constitutional or Statutory Provisions, Ordinances, Rules ............................................... 13 
Statement of Case {Including Proceedings Below) ........................................................... 13 
Statement of Facts ............................................................................................................. 14 
The Death of Lori Wimmer ..................................................................................... 16 
Alta Wimmer' s Suit for Medical Malpractice ......................................................... 21 
The Pretrial Evidentiary Rulings ............................................................................. 22 
The Directed Verdicts ............................................................................................. 23 
The Motion for New Trial ....................................................................................... 24 
Summary of Argument ...................................................................................................... 25 
Argument ........................................................................................................................... 27 
I. The Court's Directed Verdict on General Damages Was Error; 
Competent Evidence of General Damages Was Presented .................................... 27 
II. The Court's Directed Verdict on Proximate Cause Was Error; 
Competent Evidence of Proximate Cause Was Presented ..................................... 39 
III. The Court Erred in Denying a New Trial Because 
It Committed an Error of Law Regarding General Damages ................................. 46 
Page 3 of 63 
IV. The Court Erred in Admitting Evidence that 
Lori Left the Hospital on September 1, 
Against Medical Advice ......................................................................................... 4 7 
V. The Court Erred in Striking Expert Charles Landers, M.D. 
As a Rebuttal Witness ............................................................................................ 55 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 60 
Proof of Service ................................................................................................................. 62 
Addendum ......................................................................................................................... 63 
1 Transcript - Trial Testimony of Teresa Moore ................................................... A-1 
2 Transcript - Trial Testimony of Alta Wimmer ................................................ A-22 
3 Transcript-Trial Testimony of Dr. Ginsberg, expert ....................................... A-30 
4 Death Summary of Lori Wimmer, by Dr. Pandita ............................................ A-41 
5 Order on Defendants' Joint Motion for Directed Verdict ................................. A-43 
6 Order on Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial ....................................................... A-50 
7 Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion in Limine for Exclusion of"AMA" ............ A-56 
8 Memorandum Decision ..................................................................................... A-59 
9 Transcript- Oral Argument on Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial.. ................... A-65 
Page 4 of 63 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ................................ 56, 57. 58, 59, 60 
Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. 
709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985) ................................................................................................. 37 
Bansasine v. Bodell, 927 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct. App., 1996) ......................................... 12, 52 
@ Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App. 285, 12 P.3d 1015 ............................................... 35 
Boeke v. International Paint Co. (Cal.), Inc., 
27 Wash. App. 611, 620 P.2d 103 (1980) ......................................................................... 52 
Booth v. Booth, 2006 UT App 144, 134 P.3d 1151 ........................................................... l l 
Breton v. Clyde Snow & Sessions, 2013 UT App 65,299 P.3d 13 ....................... 12, 39, 47 
Bunker v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 38 Utah 575, 114 P. 764, 775 (1911) ............................ .40 
• Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P .2d 97 (Utah 1992) ................................................................. 39 
Bybee v. Abdulla, 2008 UT 3 5, 1 18, 189 P .3d 40 ........................................................... 31 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 
817 P.2d 789 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), ajf'd, 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993) ............................. 11 
Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983) ..................................................................... 36 
Dee v. Johnson, 2012 UT App 237, 286 P.3d 22 ....................................................... 12, 48 
Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, 71 P.3d 601. ......................................................... 12 
Donohue v. International Health Care, 748 P.2d 1067 (Utah 1987) ................................ l 1 
Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49,221 P.3d 205 ....................................... 35 
Page 5 of 63 
• 
Florez v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 2010 UT App 254, 118-10, 240 P.3d 107 .............. 11 
Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2007 UT 74, 171 P.3d 411 ............................................................ 53 <i) 
Gourdin v. Sharon's Cultural Educ. Recreational Ass 'n., 
845 P.2d 242 (Utah 1992) ................................................................................................. 35 
Handy v. U.S. Bank, 2008 UT App 9, 177 P.3d 80 ........................................................... 35 
Harding v. Bell, MD., 2002 UT 108, 57 P .3d 1093 (2002) .............................................. 54 
Har/ine v. Barker,' 854 P.2d 595, 600 (Utah Ct.App.), 
cert. denied, 862 P .2d 13 5 6 (Utah 1993) .......................................................................... 3 9 
In re Behm 's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 159, 213 P .2d 657 (1950) ......................................... 31 
Johnson v. Montoya, 2013 UT App 199, 308 P.3d 566 (2013) ......................................... 36 
Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982) .................................................. 27, 31, 34, 36 
Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 14 Utah 2d 330, 383 P.2d 934 (1963) ....................................... 36 
Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216 (Utah 
1980) .................... 36 
Kilpatrickv. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ..................... 40 
Magana v. Dave Roth Consr., 2009 UT 45,215 P.3d 143 ................................................ 40 
Mahmoodv. Ross, 1999 UT 104,990 P.2d 933 .......................................................... 35, 37 
Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985) .................................................. .40 
Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App 101, 158 P.3d 562 ............................................................ 35 
Ottens v. McNeil, 2010 UT App 237, 239 P.3d 308 .......................................................... 35 
Oxendine v. Overturf, 1999 UT 4, 973 P.2d 417 ............................................. 23, 27, 28, 38 
Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) ..................... 53 
Page 6 of 63 
Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2013 UT App 226, ~ 6, 311 P.3d 564 ..... 9, 10, 24, 53 
i) Renegade Oil, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 
2004 UT App 356, 101 P.3d 383 ................................................................................. 35, 37 
Sohm v. Dixie Eye Center, 2007 UT App 235, 166 P.3d 614 ........................................... 37 
.Son v. Ashland Community Healthcare Services, 
239 Or. App. 495, 244 P.3d 835 (Or. App. 2010) ............................................................. 51 
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ................ 48 
Stevens-Henager College v. Eagle Gate College, et al., 
~ 2011 UTApp37,248P.3d 1025 ...................................................................................... 37 
Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980) .......................................................... 28, 34 
Young v. Fire Ins. Exch., 2008 UT App 114, 182 P.3d 911 .............................................. 35 
Rules 
Utah R. App. P. 42(a) .......................................................................................................... 9 
@ Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7) ........................................................................................ 11, 24, 46 
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions 
UTAH CONST. art. XVI,§ 5 (1896) .............................................................................. 13, 27 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-105 ...................................................................................... 13, 30 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-106( 4) ..................................................................... 13, 28, 30, 33 
* 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107 ............................................................................................ 34 
Other Authorities 
Page 7 of 63 
MUJI 2d CV 309 (2014) ................................................................................................... 41 
MUJI 2d CV 2004 (2014) ........................................................................................... 32, 33 
Page 8 of63 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann.§ 78A-3-102(3)G). On January 29, 2014, the Utah Supreme Court entered an 
order pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, transferring this 
matter to the Utah Court of Appeals for decision. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err by entering a directed verdict against Lori Wimmer's 
heirs on the issue of general damages, when evidence presented to the jury included the 
following: that Lori lived with both her daughter Meghan and mother Alta when she went 
@ to the hospital; that Meghan came to the hospital, laid her head on Lori's chest, and said 
she loved her; that Alta visited Lori frequently in the hospital; and that Alta cried 
hysterically when told Lori would be "a vegetable" and should not be resuscitated? 
Standard of Review: "Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for 
directed verdict for correctness." Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp. 2013 UT App 226, 1 
6, 311 P .3d 564, 567. 
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Issue preservei: R. at 4026-4032 (Plaintiffs Memorandum Opposing Directed 
Verdict on General Damages Claim). 
2. Did the trial court err in entering a directed verdict against Lori Wimmer' s 
heirs on the issue of proximate cause when evidence presented to the jury stated that Dr. 
Peterson told Alta Wimmer that Lori would likely be "a vegetable;" that on the contrary 
Lori Wimmer was in fact "eminently salvageable" on the day she died; and that Dr. 
Peterson's medical evaluation of Lori's "poor prognosis" was a cause of Alta's decision 
to cease resuscitation of her daughter? 
Standard of Review: "Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for 
directed verdict for correctness." Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp. 2013 UT App 226, iJ 
6, 311 P.3d 564, 567. 
Issue preserved: R. at 3994-4001 (Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant Peterson's Motion for Directed Verdict) and R. at 4033-4040 (Memorandum 
Opposing Directed Verdict for Defendant Peterson). 
3. Did the trial court err by denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial under Utah 
1 This brief uses the following abbreviations: the consecutively paginated record on 
appeal is referred to as ("R. at_"). The transcript of a hearing or trial testimony/ruling 
is referred to by the consecutively paginated number on the cover of the transcript as 
affixed by the court clerk on the bottom right corner, followed by the separate page 
number within the transcript as provided by the transcriber (e.g., "R. _ at p. _"). 
Pursuant to Rule 24( e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, trial exhibits are cited 
according to the exhibit number affixed by the trial court ( e.g., "Plaintiffs Exhibit 11 "). 
The Addendum is referred to by the page numbers affixed to the lower right corner of 
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R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7) when the trial court had committed an error oflaw by granting a 
~ directed verdict in favor of the defendants on the issue of general damages, per Issue 1, 
above? 
Standard of Review: Generally, the trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial 
will be disturbed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Florez v. Schindler Elevator 
Corp., 2010 UT App 254,, 10,240 P.3d 107, citing Donohue v. Intermountain Health 
Care, 748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 1987). 
However, in a case where the trial court relied on its interpretation of a question of 
law as the basis for its ruling on a new trial motion, "[S]uch a legal decision is reviewed 
under a correctness standard." Booth v. Booth, 2006 UT App 144,, 10, 134 P.3d 1151, 
quoting, Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P. 2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
Issue preserved: R. at 4084-4095 (Memorandum Supporting Rule 59 Motion for 
New Trial); R. at 4181-4184 (Reply); R. 4313 (oral argument on Motion for New Trial). 
4. Did the trial court err in refusing to exclude evidence that Lori Wimmer left the 
hospital on September 1, some 8 days before her death, when the medical issue on 
September 1 was high blood sugar, not a mismanaged re-intubation2, and when Dr. 
Pandita's mismanagement of the re-intubation was the intervening cause of death? 
Standard of Review: Although intervening cause inquiries are typically 
each page of the Addendum (e.g., "Add._"). 
2 Intubate ( and re-intubate) means to place a breathing tube through the mouth or nose 
into the trachea to allow the lungs to be mechanically ventilated. (R. 4308 at p. 6, 1. 8 
though p. 7 I. 8.). 
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fact-intensive, they can be decided as a matter of law. Breton v. Clyde Snow & Sessions, 
2013 UT App 65, ,r 10,299 P.3d 13, citing Christensen & Jensen, PC v. Barrett & Daines, 
2008 UT 64, ,r 32, 194 P.3d 931 (determining causation on summary judgment); Dee v. 
Johnson, 2012 UT App 237, ,r,r 6-9, 286 P.3d 22 (holding that summary judgment was 
proper where the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn was that the defendant's 
"negligent driving was [not] the cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, 
unbroken by any new cause, produced the injury, and without which the injury would not 
have occurred"); Bansasine v. Bodell, 927 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (affirming 
summary judgment where a reasonable jury could not have found that the defendant 
caused the harm because he could not have foreseen the intervening cause of harm). 
Issue preserved: R. at 3119-3137 (Motion in Limine for Exclusion of Against 
Medical Advice Evidence); R. at 3549-3556 (Reply Memorandum). 
5. Did the trial court err in excluding Dr. Charles Landers, M.D. as a rebuttal 
witness, when Dr. Landers had been timely disclosed before trial; Defendants had 
received his full report before trial; and his anticipated testimony would address issues 
the other plaintiff experts were barred from addressing and was therefore not cumulative? 
Standard of Review: "[T]rial courts have wide discretion in determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony." Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, ,r 42, 71 P.3d 
601, 615. 
Issue preserved: R. at 2096-2113 (Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Wrongful Death 
A. The Utah Constitution 
"The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never 
be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory 
limitation, except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in death is provided 
for by law." 
UTAH CONST. Art. XVI§ 5. (Emphasis added.) 
B. Utah's Wrongful Death Statute 
"In every action under this section and Section 78B-3-105 damages may be given 
as under all the circumstances of the case may be just." 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-3-106(4). (Emphasis added.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is taken from the trial court's Order on Defendants' Joint Motion for 
Directed Verdict, entered on January 21, 2014 (R. at 4172-4178), as well as the court's 
Order on Plaintifrs Motion for New Trial, entered on April 11, 2014 (R. at 4213-4218). 
The court's Order Denying Plaintifrs Motion in Limine for Exclusion of"Against 
Medical Advice" Evidence, entered on December 5, 2013 (R. at 3958-3960), and its 
Memorandum Decision (granting defendants' motions to exclude Dr. Landers as a 
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rebuttal expert), entered on July 5, 2011 (R. at 2180-2185), are also included in the 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is a wrongful death action brought by Alta Wimmer ("Alta") for the death of 
her 33-year-old daughter, Lori Wimmer ("Lori"). Lori had one daughter, Meghan, who 
was 10 years old at the time of her mother's death. 
Because the court's directed verdicts are at issue, the facts will be drawn from the 
plaintifr s trial evidence and presented in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
Background. Lori had been a diabetic for many years and wore an insulin pump. 
On September 1, 2004, she went to Cottonwood Hospital Emergency Room to be 
evaluated for hyperglycemia (high blood sugar). Dr. David Hasleton, M.D. treated her 
there. (Defendant's Exhibit 1, at 000111.)3 
She reported that she was having polyuria ( excess urination) and polydipsia 
(excess thirst) symptoms, both of which are common in diabetics. She denied any 
headaches, neurological complaints, fever, cough, or upper respiratory symptoms. (Id.) 
She had a history of hyperglycemic episodes and had presented to the Emergency 
Department in the past for rehydration. On physical examination, Dr. Hasleton assessed 
that she was awake, alert, and oriented. She was not in any acute distress. Her 
3 The parties stipulated to admission of Defendant's Exhibit 1, a large black binder of 
medical records. The Court admitted Defendant's Exhibit 1 into evidence early in 
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• 
• 
neurologic examination was grossly intact without focal deficits. (Id.) 
Dr. Hasleton's diagnosis was hyperglycemia from diabetic ketoacidosis4 (DKA) 
or an infection. Lori was hydrated with 2 liters of saline and given 10 units of regular 
insulin. Thereafter her blood glucose level went down to 497. She elected to go home, 
saying she was comfortable taking care of herself there. She said she would increase her 
insulin pump from 0.8 units to 1.0 units, which Dr. Hasleton "felt was okay." He did 
recommend that she stay in the emergency department until her blood sugar level 
normalized, but she refused despite knowing the risks that she may go into ketoacidosis 
and/or coma. She stated she wanted to go home, that she understood the risks, and could 
manage on her own. (Id.) 
During his trial testimony, Dr. Hasleton conceded that while he explained the 
normal risks to Lori, he did not warn her of any risks or complications that included 
@> injury or death at the hands of a health provider, because that was not a complication he 
tells anybody. (R. 4309, at 114.) 
Dr. Hasleton concluded Lori had mild acidosis. He did not admit her to the 
hospital. He gave her 20 more units of regular insulin and told her to check her blood 
sugar again upon arriving home, in the middle of the night, and the next morning. He 
wrote that she would be discharged against medical advice. Lori did not sign any forms 
Plaintifrs case. (R. 4309 at p. 60, 11. 3-21.) 
4 Diabetic ketoacidosis is a metabolic abnormality in diabetic patients. It occurs when the 
body produces high levels of blood acids called ketones. Diabetic ketoacidosis develops 
~ when high blood sugar leads to excessive ketones and excessive acid in the blood. 
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acknowledging that she had been discharged against medical advice nor that she had been 
informed she was leaving against medical advice. (Defendant's Exhibit 1, at 000111.) 
She went home. 
The Death of Lori Wimmer. The next day, September 2, Lori returned to the 
hospital with significant vomiting and was found to be in severe DKA. She was 
significantly agitated and in respiratory distress in the emergency room, was intubated 
emergently, and was placed on a ventilator machine in the ICU. (Defendant's Exhibit 1, 
at 000337, Death Summary dictated by Dr. Pandita.) Lori remained in the ICU for the 
next 6 days. 
Lori's DKA improved with aggressive hydration and insulin therapy. She was 
sometimes agitated, so she was continuously sedated. Her heart was checked with an 
echocardiogram that showed normal function. (Id.) 
On September 5, Dr. Peterson was called for a neurological consultation and felt 
Lori had metabolic encephalopathy6 due to DKA. An EEG7 was obtained which showed 
a slow response. Dr. Peterson felt Lori had a poor prognosis based on the overall clinical 
status as well as the EEG findings. (Id.) 
On September 7, Dr. Pandita saw Lori again. By then, her DKA had completely 
resolved, but she continued to be comatose. Lori was still on sedation at this time, and it 
6 Metabolic encephalopathy describes brain tissue not functioning properly. The 
impairment is not due to stroke or other physical injury, but due instead to metabolic 
abnormalities, such as toxins, infection or lack of oxygen. (R. 4309 at pp. 161-164 ). 
7 EEG is an electroencephalogram, a way of measuring voltages related to brain activity. 
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was unclear whether some of her neurological deficits were due to sedation. However, 
@J she did not need significant support from the ventilator, so he started weaning her from 
the machine. Nevertheless, her neurological function was still poor, and it was unclear 
whether this was due to sedation. Dr. Pandita told Lori's family that he would try to 
Ii discontinue sedation and then assess Lori's underlying neurologic response. (Id.) 
On September 8, Dr. Pandita wrote that Lori's blood gases looked good, and she 
had a good gag reflex. He noted that it was difficult to keep her off sedation and keep her 
intubated as well. Dr. Pandita felt it important not to restart sedation so he could learn her 
underlying neurologi_c response. Since she had been on minimal ventilator support, he 
thought it reasonable to extubate8 her and see if all her agitation was due to being 
intubated and whether she would not need more sedation. He extubated Lori that morning. 
(Id.) 
The difficulty noted by Dr. Pandita in keeping Lori intubated was observed by 
Lori's sister Teresa and mother Alta. On September 3, Teresa and Alta were in Lori's 
room and observed that Lori would kick her arms and legs and grab for the breathing tube. 
The hospital staff restrained her around each wrist and each ankle to prevent her 
grabbing the tube. (R. 4311 at 572-573.) On September 7, Teresa was told that Lori was 
doing much better. She was excited to see her, and when she came to her room, she saw 
that Lori was totally exposed from the waist down. The nurse said they took the sheet 
away because she kept kicking it off. (R. 4311 at p. 594, 11. 6-20.) 
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After her extubation, Lori was treated for stridor9 at 11 :45 and 11 :55 that morning 
by a respiratory therapist, Max Kunzler. (R. 4309 at p. 116-118.) Mr. Kunzler testified 
that Lori was a good candidate for MDI (a metered-dose inhaler, a device for 
self-administered lung medication) because she could hold her breath for 3 seconds and 
could follow directions. (R. 4309 at 150-151.) 
While Lori was with Mr. Kunzler, Lori's mother Alta and sister Teresa arrived for 
a family conference with Dr. Pandita, Dr. Peterson, and a social worker named Brenda 
Zigich. At this conference, Dr. Peterson told Alta that there was a progressive 
deterioration in Lori's neurological status, that she had no purposeful response, that her 
neurological prognosis was very poor, and that Lori could end up in a "persistent 
vegetative state." Alta told the doctors that Lori had clearly said she did not want to end 
up in a vegetative state. However, the family was not ready to withdraw care and needed 
more time to decide. (Defendant's Exhibit 1, at p. 000338.) 
Around this same time, Lori began having increased respiratory distress. The 
doctors decided to re-intubate Lori while the family decided what to do. Lori's vocal 
cords were very hard to visualize, and there was significant swelling around her larynx. 
Bag mask ventilation10 was started. Dr. Pandita called for assistance with the 
8 Extubate means to remove the breathing tube. 
9 Stridor is a high-pitched sound in the vocal cord area, indicating swelling in the vocal 
cords and difficulty breathing. (R. 4309, at p. 121, 11. 13-25.) 
10 Bag mask ventilation, known as "bagging," provides oxygen to a patient with the help 
of a mask on the face, connected to a bag. The bag is compressed, forcing oxygen to the 
lungs. (R. 4310, at p. 332, 11. 16-24.) 
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• 
re-intubation. Dr. Eric Smart, an emergency room doctor, arrived and attempted to 
ti, re-intubate without success. Dr. Pandita called for an in-house anesthesiologist who again 
attempted to re-intubate, without success. They again started bagging11 and were able to 
keep Lori's oxygen at acceptable levels by that means. Dr. Smart then suggested a blind 
<I intubation, which he did himself. In a blind intubation, the doctor puts the tube into the 
patient's mouth without being able to see whether it goes into the trachea (leading to the 
lungs) or the esophagus (leading to the stomach). Meanwhile a tracheotomy kit (to cut a 
hole in Lori's throat in case the tube did not go into the trachea) had been requested and 
brought in. (Id.) 
The anesthesiologist felt that Lori's chest movement seemed symmetrical and the 
tube placement was likely okay. However, Lori's blood oxygen levels did not come up, 
and her heart started slowing down. (Id.) 
Dr. Smart, the Emergency Physician, saw that Lori's blood oxygen levels were not 
improving and recognized the tube was not in the trachea. He charted that "I 
recommended that it be removed. There was some concern that if it were in place, we 
would hate to lose the tube placement expressed by several other people in the room. 
However, it was my opinion that the tube was not in place." (Defendant's Exhibit 1, at 
000130.) 
Dr. Ali, plaintifrs expert, put it a little more plainly: "Well, my understanding is 
11 Bagging can successfully deliver oxygen to a patient for 15, 30 minutes, even longer. 
(ii) (R. 4310, at p. 338, 11. 17-25.) 
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that Dr. Smart, who put the tube in, was adamant that the tube needed to come out, but 
unfortunately, he was overruled by the captain of the ship [Dr. Pandita]." (R. 4310 at p. 
517, · IL 20-23.) "What we have here is Dr. Smart' s note, which documents an extended 
course of low oxygen level and a doctor that is basically fussing around with the 
bronchoscope12, looking at this and basically wasting time while the patient is dying." (R. • 
4310 at p. 549 I. 25 top. 550, I. 4.) 
Dr. Ali found that Dr. Smart's note described a "disaster" in Dr. Pandita's 
handling of the situation, observing that Dr. Smart wrote such a long note because "[h]e 
wanted to make sure that he didn't get blamed for what he thought was a disaster." (R. 
4310 at p. 551, 11. 2-4.) It was during this period of time, while Dr. Pandita was fussing 
around with the brorichoscope, that Lori went into cardiac arrest and received CPR. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 1, at 000130.) 
Dr. Ali testified that Dr. Pandita's failure to remove the tube immediately upon 
learning it was misplaced was a breach of the standard of care, that the breach caused 
Lori's death, and that Dr. Pandita's refusal to remove the tube immediately was so 
unreasonable that, if Dr. Pandita were his student, he would "flunk him." (R. 4310 at p. 
518, 11. 1-15.) It was Dr. Ali's opinion that in Lori's situation, her life was on the line and 
every second counted; Dr. Pandita should have immediately removed the misplaced tube 
and resumed a method of ventilation that was effective-namely, the bag mask. (R. 4310 
atp. 516, 11. 15-22 andp. 517, 11. 2-4.) 
12 A bronchoscope is a long, flexible tube with a light at one end, used to view the lungs. 
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While the failed attempts at re-intubation and using the bronchoscope were 
• underway, Brenda Zigich escorted Alta and Lori's family into the room where 
resuscitation was taking place. Dr. Pandita asked Alta ifhe should continue resuscitation. 
Alta, believing that her daughter had no hope of meaningful recovery, asked that 
resuscitation be stopped. Dr. Pandita then stopped CPR. Lori expired and was declared 
dead at 1338 hours. (Id.) 
Alta Wimmer's Suit for Medical Malpractice. On June 14, 2005, Alta Wimmer 
• 
• 
filed suit for the wrongful death of her daughter. She brought suit on her own behalf and 
also on behalf of Meghan, who is another heir of Lori's estate. (R. at 1-9.) 
At trial, Alta Wimmer presented evidence of the following (for citations to the trial 
record, please see "The Death of Lori Wimmer" section, supra) that Dr. Pandita was 
negligent in managing the removal of Lori's breathing tube ("extubation") and the 
attempts to re-intubate Lori, and in failing to timely maintain the flow of oxygen to Lori's 
brain, either by bagging or by cutting a hole in Lori's throat to open an airway. Dr. 
Pandita failed to recognize that when Dr. Smart blindly re-intubated Lori, the breathing 
tube went into Lori's esophagus rather than her trachea, so air was going to Lori's 
stomach rather than her lungs. Upon hearing Dr. Smart's report that the tube was 
misplaced in the esophagus, the standard of care required immediate removal of the tube 
and a return to manual ventilation with a bag and mask. Instead, Dr. Pandita's "fussing 
around" delayed removal of the tube and delayed bagging for such a long time that Lori's 
heart slowed dangerously, prompting CPR and eventual death. 
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The plaintiff also presented evidence that Dr. Peterson was negligent in 
prematurely advising Alta that Lori could end up in a persistent vegetative state, and that 
his negligence was a cause of Lori's death. Plaintifrs expert Dr. Ginsberg testified that 
in two studies he was aware of, diabetics of similar age and health to Lori, who were in 
comas from diabetic ketoacidosis, had a mortality rate of 13 percent in one study and zero 
(0) percent in another study. (R. 4310 at p. 453, 1. 12 top. 454, 1. 20.) He also testified 
that Lori was "eminently salvageable," that she just needed more time to get back to 
normal (R. 4310 at p. 456, 11. 1-2), and that much of Lori's reduced neurological function 
was due to the large amounts of sedatives in her system rather than any real neurological 
damage. (R. 4310 at p. 458, 1. 11 top. 460, 1. 12.) 
Dr. Peterson's grim prognosis about the condition of Lori's brain, delivered in his 
capacity as a neurologist, caused Alta to believe that Lori would not have a meaningful 
recovery even if resuscitation were successful. Thus she declined to continue 
resuscitation when confronted with the alarming scene of her dying daughter undergoing 
CPR and attempted intubation. (R. 4310 at p. 468, 11. 8-23.) 
The Pretrial Evidentiary Rulings. On July 5, 2011, the trial court entered a 
Memorandum Decision granting defendants' motion to exclude Dr. Charles Landers as a 
rebuttal expert for the plaintiff. (R. at 2180.) The court reached the conclusion that "Dr. 
Landers' testimony is not proper rebuttal testimony and is cumulative of plaintifr s other 
experts." (R. at 2183.) 
On December 5, 2013, the trial court entered an Order Denying Plaintifrs Motion 
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• 
• 
in Limine for Exclusion of "Against Medical Advice" Evidence. The court ruled that 
ii) medical records referring to Lori's departure "against medical advice" may be admitted. 
As reason for its ruling, the court adopted the reasons stated in defendants' opposition 
memorandum. (R. at 3958-3960.) 
The Directed Verdicts. After 4 days of trial and the testimony of 10 witnesses, 
plaintiff rested her case. Defendants then moved for directed verdict on the grounds that 
plaintiff had not proved noneconomic damages and, in the case of Dr. Peterson, had not 
proved causation. The court orally ruled on the motions on the morning of December 12, 
2014 (R. 4312 at pp. 704-709), and on January 21, 2014, the Court entered its formal 
Order on Defendants' Joint Motion for Directed Verdict. (R. at 4172.) 
As to the question of noneconomic damages, the court found that plaintif rs trial 
evidence "says nothing about the loss of society, love, companionship, protection and 
@ affection allegedly suffered ... and is therefore insufficient to establish a claim for 
non-economic damages under Oxendine v. Overturf" (R. at 417 5.) 
• 
As to the question of causation, the court found that "[ d]uring trial, Plaintiff 
elicited testimony from her expert Dr. "Ginsberg that Dr. Peterson's actions indirectly led 
to Alta Wimmer' s decision to cease resuscitation efforts on the decedent. The Court 
finds that such an indirect effect is insufficient for Plaintiff to meet her burden pursuant 
to Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp . ... " (R. at 4176.) 
The Motion for New Trial. After the trial court had orally ruled on the directed 
verdict motions and had released the jury from service, plaintiffs filed a Motion for New 
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Trial on or about December 31, 2013. (R. at 4082.) Plaintiffs argued that a new trial 
should be granted on the basis of an error of law under Rule 59(a)(7), namely the 
granting of the directed verdicts. 
Oral argument was held on March 18, 2014. (R. 4313,passim.) During oral 
argument, the trial court made several notable statements that indicated it was indulging 
negative inferences against the plaintiffs, rather than in their favor, and in fact said "the 
heck with you" and did not care how good plaintiffs arguments were. Examples of 
statements from the trial judge, regarding Lori Wimmer, include the following: 
1. "Thanks for dying. It hurts. I'm sad. But it's the best result for everybody." 
(R. 4313, at p. 35, 11. 21-22.) 
2. ~'There's no positive inference at all. I mean there's nothing positive in this 
relationship." (R. 4313, at p.35, 1. 24-25.) 
3. "[M]om and dad walk out with crocodile tears and all this money." (R. 
4313, at p. 38, 11. 4-5." 
4. "But this is an in-your-face argument, and it's not being taken very well by 
this Court. I'm indulging it. I'll take it. But I'm telling you, you're out of order and 
you're offensive and you don't need to be .... But the way you're presenting it, it's 
like-the Court's either going to just be shamed into adopting your-or it will dig in its 
heels and say to heck with you. I don't care how good your argument is." (R. 4313, at p. 
25 1. 22 top. 26, 1. 8.) 
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5. "[T]hat child has been nothing but a source of frustration, expense, anger 
e and heartbreak to that parent. ... now this child who has been strung out on dope and 
drugs and crime for 25 years is now in the hospital, the victim of some wrongful act." 
(R. 4313, at p. 28, 11. 7-9, 18-20. 
After expressing its views, the trial court entered its final Order on Plaintifr s 
Motion for New Trial on April 11, 2014, denying a new trial. (R. at 4213-4218). 
This appeal timely followed (R. at 4050-51; R. at 4219-4300). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Directed Verdict on General Damages. 
The court's directed verdict on general damages was error because plaintiffs 
(I presented competent evidence of their damages at trial. Plaintiffs have a constitutional 
right to recover damages for wrongful death, not subject to any statutory limitation. Any 
evidence, no matter how improbable, is sufficient to overcome directed verdict. 
II. Directed Verdict on Proximate Cause. 
The court's directed verdict on proximate case was error because plaintiffs 
presented competent evidence of proximate causation. Proximate cause is generally a 
fact-intensive question for the jury. 
III. Denial of a New Trial. 
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A new trial should have been granted because. the court committed an error of law 
in granting the directed verdict on general damages. If the appellate court agrees with 
that proposition, the new trial ruling should be reversed. 
IV. Refusal to Exclude Evidence of Leaving Hospital 8 Days Before Death. 
The trial court erred in admitting evidence that Lori left the hospital on September 
1 against medical advice. The intervening acts of Dr. Pandita and Dr. Peterson broke the 
chain of proximate cause for Lori's acts. Utah follows the majority rule that a patient's 
pre-treatment negligence does not excuse the doctor's negligent treatment. Lori cannot 
be held contributorily negligent because her negligence is not causally connected to her 
lllJUry. 
V. Striking Dr. Landers as a Rebuttal Witness. 
The court erred in striking Dr. Landers as a rebuttal witness. Plaintiffs have a 
right to rebuttal when the defense raises new issues in its case. Dr. Landers' testimony 
was not cumulative. 
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I. 
ARGUMENT 
The Court's Directed Verdict on General Damages13 Was Error; 
There Was Competent Evidence of General Damages. 
A. Plaintiffs Have a Constitutional Right to Recover Damages for 
Wrongful Death, Not Subject to Any Statutory Limitation, and 
A Statutory Right to Damages Based on "All the Circumstances." 
The right to recover damages for wrongful death is assured by the Utah 
Constitution. "The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, 
shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any 
statutory limitation, except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in death 
is provided for by law." Utah Const. Art. XVI,§ 5 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, the defendants persuaded the trial court that plaintifr s 
damages should be limited to certain explicit factors previously enumerated as guides for 
determining general damages, but the Utah Constitution bars any such limitation on the 
amount recoverable in a wrongful death case. 
Because the Utah Constitution expressly forbids any limitation on damages, and 
13 The Model Utah Jury Instructions, 2d Ed. (MUJI 2d) use "noneconomic damages" as a 
synonym for general damages, but many Utah cases use the term "general damages." 
Hence, the term "general damages" will be used herein to refer to the same principle. 
Moreover, the term "noneconomic damages" is phrased in a negative way (using 
@ the prefix "non-") such that it carries a negative connotation, suggesting to the mind that 
noneconomic damages are somehow lesser, or non-important, or non-existent, compared 
to economic damages, when in fact Utah case law makes it clear that general damages are 
frequently more important, and more valuable, than economic damages. See, e.g., 
Oxendine v. Overturf, 1999 UT 4, 1 19, 973 P .2d 417, citing Jones v. Carvell, 641 P .2d 
105, 108 (Utah 1982) ("the greatest losses arising from the wrongful death of a child are 
@) not those losses which are economic in nature.") This importance is better reflected by 
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because Utah's Wrongful Death statute expressly mandates that damages be awarded 
according to "all the circumstances" of the case (Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-3-106(4)), the 
trial court's reliance on any subset of factors listed in Oxendine v. Overturf, Switzer v. 
Reynolds, or any other case, in directing a verdict that prevented plaintiff from recovering 
damages for Lori's wrongful death was erroneous and contrary to both the Utah 
Constitution and Utah statute. 
B. The Evidence Prese~ted to the Jury During Trial 
Was Sufficient to Overcome Directed Verdict. 
The bulk of the evidence regarding the society, companionship, love, affection, 
and kindly demeanor between Lori and her heirs (Alta and Meghan) came from two trial 
witnesses: Teresa Moore (Lori's sister), and Alta Wimmer herself. The following 
evidence of general damages was presented at trial. 
I. The Testimony of Teresa Moore (Lori's sister): 
Teresa Moore, Lori's sister, testified at trial to numerous facts about Lori's 
relationship with her heirs (Meghan and Alta) that had a bearing on general damages: 
(a) Meghan [Lori's daughter and heir] was in the hospital room where her mother 
had just barely died (right after the machines had been turned off), and "Meghan walked 
over to her [Lori] and put her head on her chest and just told her that she loved her and 
that she wished she would wake up. And then we just - let Meghan just stay with her for 
a little while and then we left the room." (R. 4311 at p. 631, 11. 1-6) (emphasis added). 
the term "general damages." 
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(b) That Meghan was Lori's only child, and that Lori and Meghan lived together 
with Alta Wimmer [Lori's mother and heir]. (R. 4311 at p. 564, 11. 20-25 top. 565, 1. 5.) 
( c) That Alta Wimmer spent a great deal of time at the hospital with Lori. (R. 
4311, at p. 568, 11. 5-6; R. 4311 at p. 600, 11. 11-16.) 
(d) That when Alta Wimmer was told that her daughter, Lori, would be a 
"vegetable," the comment put Alta into a "state of shock." (R. 4311 at p. 617, 11. 8-23.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
( e) That when Alta Wimmer was led into the room where the doctors were 
performing CPR and trying to resuscitate Lori, Alta began crying hysterically. (R. 4311 
at p. 626, 11. 20-23.) (Emphasis added.) 
(t) That when Alta Wimmer was told that Lori's condition was not looking good, 
and that Lori would likely be a "vegetable" or severely retarded, Alta began shaking and 
€Ji0 crying. (R. 4311 atp. 618, 11. 5-9; R. 4311 atp. 619, 11. 12-25.) 
(g) That when Alta was discussing Lori's medical care, specifically Dr. Pandita's 
decision to extubate Lori, Alta's desire was to see that "the best thing" was done for Lori. 
(R. 4311 at p. 608, 11. 20-23.) 
2. The Testimony of Alta Wimmer (Lori's mother): 
(a) Alta was having a "rough time" emotionally with the fact that her daughter 
Lori was sick and in the ICU. (R. 4311 at p. 644, 11. 13-18.) 
(b) Alta went into a "state of shock" when she heard that Lori's condition had 
taken a tum for the worse. (R. 4311 at p. 647, 11. 2-4.) 
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(c) Alta's love, affection, and concern for Lori were fundamental to the 
end-of-life family conference during which the social worker, Brenda Zigich, kept 
repeatedly patting Alta on the leg and saying "you wouldn't want her [Lori] to live like 
this." (R. 4311 at p. 648, 11. 12-21.) 
The fact that Alta knew what Lori's wishes were for end-of-life planning ("The 
mother informed us that the patient had clearly indicated she did not want to end up in a 
vegetative state.") is also evidence of the society and companionship and trust between 
Lori and Alta. (Defendant's Exhibit 1 at 000338.) 
This testimony, presented to the jury at trial, by members of Lori's own family, 
provides sufficient evidence of the companionship, society, love and affection that 
existed between Lori, Meghan, and Alta, and provides a sound basis on which a 
reasonable jury could find general damages for Lori's heirs. 
C. Wrongful Death Actions Occupy a "Privileged Position"; General 
Damages May Be Inferred from "All Circumstances" of a Case. 
Damages awarded for wrongful death are in a special class, and are not limited to 
specific elements, but are guided by all the circumstances of the case. "In every action 
under this section and Section 78B-3-105 damages may be given as under all the 
circumstances of the case may be just." Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-3-106(4). 
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court has reiterated that "wrongful death occupies a 
position of privilege among torts." Bybee v. Abdulla, 2008 UT 35, ~ 18, 189 P.3d 40. 
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Thus, the trial court's ruling that there was no evidence as to the so-called 
"mandatory elements" of general damages is improper under Utah law. Utah law requires 
no particularity as to any element of general damages. Rather, general damage is in itself 
an element of the larger claim for wrongful death. 
Elements of damage discussed in Utah case law are permissive elements which the 
jury "may" consider as guidelines. For example, "[T]he loss of affection, counsel and 
advice, the loss of deceased care and solicitude for the welfare of ... her family and the 
loss of the comfort and pleasure the family of the deceased would have received are all 
matters to be considered in assessing damages recoverable ... " In re Behm 's Estate, at 661 
(1950). 
Jones v Carvell, 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982) stated that "to assign a monetary 
value to loss of comfort, society, love companionship, advice and protection in some 
i) realistic manner, the trier of fact may consider factors relating to the physical, emotional, 
and psychological relationship between the deceased and those entitled to recover, 
including the kindly demeanor [among the] family." Id., at 108. 
Jones went on to opine that "such losses are difficult to quantify and impossible to 
fit into a mathematical formula which translates them in any precise fashion into 
monetary values. But the alternatives raise an even more serious problem. To say that 
the law recognizes no loss for intangible injuries resulting from a wrongful death is 
repugnant ... " Id., at 108. (Emphasis added.) "Experience demonstrates thatjuries and 
judges are able to translate the loss of a child's life into monetary values in a manner 
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which has been generally accepted as reasonable and has avoided grossly disparate 
damage awards." Id. 
The discretion of the jury in awarding damages will of course be guided by 
the evidence adduced, the common sense of the jury, and the values they 
reflect from the community from whence they come. Various kinds of 
evidence are likely to have some relevancy in giving appropriate guidance. 
This Court has previously referred to the kindly demeanor between the 
members of the family as a relevant factor. Id., at 110. 
Such factors do not constitute a separate measure of damage as such, but 
they may demonstrate the nature of the psychological investment which has 
contributed to the love and affection which tend to create a bonding of the 
child and its parents. To that extent such factors may assist in the 
determination of the monetary amount to be awarded for the loss of love, 
affection and society. 
Id., at lll. 
Given that these damages are difficult to calculate mathematically, wrongful death 
plaintiffs are given considerable latitude "to demonstrate the nature of the psychological 
investment which has contributed to the love and affection which tend to create a bonding 
of the child and its (sic) parents. To that extent such factors may assist in the 
determination of the monetary amount to be awarded for the loss of love, affection and 
society." Id., at ll 1. 
The Model Utah Jury Instructions provide that "the law does not require the 
testimony of any witness to establish the amount of noneconomic damages." MUJI 2d 
CV 2004 (2014) (emphasis added). This same instruction, which the parties stipulated to 
use in this case (R. at 3843, 3881, 2) also provides that such a determination of general 
damages is the province of the jury and that if a jury finds for the plaintiff, but fails to 
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award any general damages, the jury is instructed to make such a damages award, "even 
el) though they may be difficult to compute." MUJI 2d CV 2004 (2014 ). 
In the present case, a woman died in the prime of her life (33 years old). When she 
died, she was the mother of a ten-year-old daughter. She was a daughter herself. Both of 
GD Lori's heirs, her mother Alta and daughter Meghan, had an uncontroverted bond of 
society, companionship and love with Lori. To conclude that the jury was not even 
entitled to consider the fact that such a catastrophe resulted in general damages to the 
woman's heirs is contrary to law and common experience. 
Moreover, the central core of a wrongful death action is the loss of the 
companionship and society of the deceased. Once evidence was presented at trial that 
Lori lived with Alta and Meghan, as indeed it was, her "companionship and society" was 
sufficiently established to create a jury issue. Lori's death severed that companionship 
@> and society, thus triggering the damages allowed under the Wrongful Death statute. As 
noted above, "In every action under this section ... damages may be given as under all 
the circumstances of the case may be just." Utah Code §78B-3-106 (4). 
Under the wrongful death statute, there is but a single cause of action, viz., 
it arises from a particular wrongful act for which there can be but one claim 
against the tort-feasor for damages .... In this single action the full value of 
the life of deceased is determined and recovered, and the wrongdoer cannot 
be compelled to respond again for the damages ... This action is for the loss 
suffered by the heirs by reason of death. This Court enumerated the 
elements to be considered in assessing damages recoverable in a wrongful 
death action: financial support furnished; loss of affection, counsel, and 
advice; loss of deceased's care and solicitude for the welfare of the family; 
and loss of the comfort and pleasure the family of deceased would have 
received." 
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Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244,246 (Utah 1980). 
In addition, as Lori's personal representative, plaintiff Alta Wimmer is also 
entitled to recover the special and general damages sustained by her deceased daughter 
Lori, which include the loss of the value of Lori's life under Utah Code Ann.§ 
78B-3-107. 
A cause of action arising out of personal injury to a person, or death caused 
by the wrongful act or negligence of another, does not abate upon the death 
of the ... injured person. The injured person or the personal representatives 
or heirs of the person who died, has a cause of action against the wrongdoer 
... for special and general damages ... 
Id., at (l)(a). 
Utah has not limited recovery under either its wrongful death or survival statutes 
to economic losses. "[T]his jurisdiction has emphasized from the beginning that the 
greatest losses arising from the wrongful death of a child are not those losses which are 
economic in nature. It is the loss of society, love, companionship, protection and 
affection which usually constitute the heart of the action." Jones, at 108. 
Thus the issue of general damages should not have been taken from the jury by a 
directed verdict. 
D. "Any Evidence" "No Matter How Improbable" Is Sufficient to 
Overcome a Directed Verdict. 
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A directed verdict "motion can be granted only when the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter oflaw." Moore v. Smith 2007 UT App. 101,, 18, 158 P.3d 562. 
See also, Beardv. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App. 285,, 5, 12 P.3d 1015. 
"Where there is any evidence that raises a question of material fact, no matter how 
~ improbable the evidence may appear, judgment as a matter of law is improper." Ottens v. 
McNeil, 2010 UT App. 237,, 19,239 P.3d 308, quoting Young v. Fire Ins. Exch., 2008 
UT App. 114,, 20, 182 P.3d 911. Accordingly, the Utah appellate courts will "review a 
trial court's grant of directed verdict for correctness [and will sustain a directed verdict 
only ifJ after examining all evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, 
there is no competent evidence that would support a verdict in the non-moving party's 
favor." Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49,, 19,221 P.3d 205. 
When a trial court rules on a motion for directed verdict, that court must review 
(i) "the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the [ non-moving party and determine ifJ 'reasonable minds could 
disagree with the ground asserted for directing a verdict."' Renegade Oil, Inc. v. 
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 2004 UT App. 356,, 6, 101 P.3d 383. See Mahmoodv. Ross, 
1999 UT 104, 116, 990 P.2d 933. Similarly, whether a party has proven a prima facie 
case, such as the element of general damages, is a question of law. Handy v. U.S. Bank, 
2008 UT App 9,, 12, 177 P.3d 80. 
E. The General Damages Issue Should Have Gone to the Jury Even 
Without "Direct Evidence" of Pain and Suffering. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that it is reversible error to fail to instruct a jury 
on mental pain and anguish, "even where there is no direct evidence of such mental 
pain ... as [it may be] fairly inferred from injuries sustained." Juddv. Rowley's Cherry 
Hill Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Utah 1980). 
Lori Wimm~r' s case involved the ultimate injury-death. If ever there were a case 
where mental pain and anguish could be "inferred from injuries sustained," death would 
be such a case. No direct evidence of mental pain and anguish is required when the 
"injuries sustained" support a fair inference of pain and suffering. Death, and the effect of 
death on one's family, can be fairly said to be such an injury. 
To assign a monetary value to loss of comfort, society, love, companionship, 
advice, and protection in some realistic manner, the trier of fact may consider factors 
relating to the physical, emotional, and psychological relationship, between the deceased 
and those entitled to recover, including the kindly demeanor between members of a 
family." Jones, at 108 (emphasis added). 
Juries are generally allowed wide discretion in the assessment of damages. Cruz v. 
Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1983). Where personal injuries involve a loss of 
employment, personal inconvenience, and pain and suffering, there is no set formula to 
compute the amount of damages. Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 14 Utah 2d 330,383 P.2d 934 
(1963). 
The trial court, in granting the directed verdict, misread the holdings of 
Stevens-Henager College v. Eagle Gate College, et al., 2011 UT App 37,248 P. 3d 1025; 
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Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985); and 
Sohm v. Dixie Eye Center, 2007 UT App 235, 166 P.3d 614. These cases require only 
that there be some evidence of a "reasonable probability" of the fact that damages 
occurred, not the incantation of any magical words to establish general damages. The 
€i) legal standard for such evidence must be viewed, along with "all reasonable inferences," 
in a "light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Renegade Oil, 2004 UT App 356, 16; 
Mahmood, 1999 UT 104, ~ 16. 
The fact that Lori Wimmer lived at home with her mother Alta and daughter 
Meghan was evidence of a "reasonable probability" that damages were suffered by Alta 
and Meghan, her heirs. The court trial weighed this evidence on its own, substituting its 
own view for that of the jury, stating that people who live together may not necessarily 
like one another ( even gratuitously invoking the poet Robert Frost that "Home is the 
Ci) place ... they have to take you in"). (R. 4312 at 707, 11. 24-25.) 
Had the jury been allowed to consider the question, they would have been free to 
draw precisely the opposite inference that a grown daughter and mother (Lori and Alta) 
had a wonderful bond. Moreover, Meghan's loss of her mother, especially in a family 
where the parents were living separately, would wreak irreparable and life-long damage 
on a 10-year-old daughter, especially one who put her head on her dying mother's chest, 
told her she loved her, and asked her to awake. Mother and child were not estranged. 
There was no evidence that they even disliked one another. Simply put, a child of 
Meghan's age would be bereft at the loss of her mother. A mother, especially one who is 
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living with her daughter and daily at her daughter's bedside, would be bereft at the death 
of her 33-year-old child. The court had no basis in allowing poets, even a Poet Laureate 
like Robert Frost, to decide an issue bound for the jury, and it committed an error in law 
by so doing. 
F. Oxendine v. Overturf Does Not Apply In This Case. 
The trial court found "particularly persuasive" the case of Oxendine v. Overturf, 
1999 UT 4, 973 P .2 417 for the key part of its analysis that no "general damages" had 
been proven. 
However, the Oxendine case did not apply to the facts that were before the trial 
court. Contrary to the trial court's stated assumption, Oxendine was not actually a 
medical malpractice or wrongful death case. Rather, as noted in the first paragraph of the 
opinion, it was an appeal from separate cases "concerning the proper distribution between 
heirs of settlement proceeds." Oxendine, at ,I 1. The issue before the court was a 
"summary judgment in favor of ... the probate heirs and their attorneys. The trial court 
held, as a matter of law, that she was not entitled to bring claims against them to recover 
a share in the settlement proceeds." Id. ( emphasis added). 
Thus, the key issue was whether or not the plaintiff could claim a share of the 
settlement proceeds. The issue was not whether a claim for medical malpractice or 
wrongful death had been made out against a doctor. The wrongful death claim was never 
at issue because a settlement was paid, and the dispute concerned only how to divide 
those settlement proceeds. 
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Moreover, it is unprecedented under Utah law to hold that in a wrongful death 
case against a negligent tortfeasor, an individual heir must prove the extent of her general 
damages to overcome a motion for directed verdict. Neither defendants nor the trial court 
have cited a single case in support of such a novel proposition. None has been found to 
il the best of counsel's knowledge. 
II. The Court's Directed Verdict on Proximate Cause Was Error; 
There Was Competent Evidence of Proximate Cause. 
The trial court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of Dr. David Peterson 
on the grounds that there was no testimony establishing that his negligence was a 
proximate cause of Lori Wimmer's death. 
A. Proximate Cause Is Generally a Fact-Intensive Question for the Jury. 
"Generally, causation 'cannot be resolved as a matter of law."' Butterfield v. 
Okubo, 83 l P .2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992). "Proximate cause is an issue of fact. Thus, only if 
there is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation, is summary 
judgment appropriate." Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 600 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert. 
denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). 
Causation is highly fact-sensitive. "[C]ausation is a highly fact-sensitive element 
of any cause of action and generally cannot be resolved as a matter oflaw." Breton v. 
€i> Clyde Snow & Sessions, 2013 UT App 65,, 10,299 P.3d 13. Utah courts have 
recognized that "[ f]act-sensitive cases ... do not lend themselves to a determination on 
summary judgment." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1292 (Utah Ct. 
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App., 1996). Likewise, they should not be determined on directed verdict. 
"[D]oubts about whether a nonmovant has established a genuine issue of material 
fact should be resolved in favor of permitting the party to go to trial." Butterfield, at 107. 
In Butterfield, under facts similar to those in the present case, "plaintiff adduced expert 
evidence creating genuine issues of material fact as to whether the doctors' conduct was 
negligent and whether it caused [plaintifr s] death. Consequently, the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment for [the doctors]." Id. 
Directed verdict, like summary judgment, resolves the proximate cause issue as a 
matter oflaw without a jury. For the same reason, directed verdict should be rejected. 
Proximate cause is "that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, 
unbroken by any new cause, produced the injury, and without which the injury would not 
have occurred." Bunker v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 38 Utah 575, 114 P. 764, 775 (1911). 
"An event is the legal or proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury when the event 
'in natural and continuous sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), 
produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.'" Magana v. 
Dave Roth Constr., 2009 UT 45,127, 215 P.3d 143 (quoting Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 
697 P.2d 240, 245-46 (Utah 1985)). 
The current Model Utah Jury Instruction defining "cause" reads as follows: "As 
used in the law, the word "cause" has a special meaning, and you must use this meaning 
whenever you apply the word. "Cause" means that: (1) The person's act or failure to act 
produced the harm directly or set in motion events that produced the harm in a 
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natural and continuous sequence; and (2) The person's act or failure to act could be 
<e foreseen by a reasonable person to produce a harm of the same general nature. There 
may be more than one cause of the same harm." MUJI 2d CV309 (2014) (emphasis 
added). This jury instruction was stipulated to by the parties. (R. at 3843, 3877 .) 
The trial court erroneously focused only on the first method of causation (i.e., a 
"direct cause") and overlooked the second, alternate, and equally valid method of 
causation: the "natural and continuous sequence" mode of causation. 
B. Plaintiffs Presented Sufficient Evidence that Dr. Peterson's 
Negligent Medical Advice Was a Proximate Cause of Lori's Death. 
There was sufficient evidence adduced at trial that Dr. Peterson's negligent advice 
caused the death of Lori Wimmer by influencing Alta Wimmer to reject continued 
resuscitation efforts for her daughter during an emergency situation. The evidence for this 
causal link came from at least three witnesses: (1) Dr. Ginsberg, plaintiffs neurology 
expert; (2) Teresa Moore, Lori's sister; and (3) Dr. Pandita's own Death Summary 
record. 
1. Dr. Ginsberg. 
During Dr. Ginsberg's testimony at trial, he made an explicit connection between 
Lori's death and the negligence of Dr. Peterson: 
A. My opinion is that there was a breach of the standard of care by 
Dr. Peterson that indirectly resulted in a very negative feeling for ... 
Lori's mom when they were asked by Dr. Pandita whether or not they 
should do a tracheostomy or attempt to put the breathing tube back in. 
I think there was a breach of the standard of care there that indirectly 
resulted in Alta Wimmer stopping the resuscitation where it was. And 
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I think had Dr. Peterson gone to Dr. Pandita before that meeting and said, 
wait, this is too early, really, to do anything. We need to keep everything 
going and I want to tell the family we can't make any prognosis and we're 
certainly not going to give the kind of grim prognosis that was given, where 
there was a reference to vegetable and vegetative state. 
(R. 4310 at p. 468, 11. 8-23.) (Emphasis added.) 
Dr. Ginsberg went on to reiterate his opinion that Dr. Peterson's advice adversely 
impacted the decision to halt resuscitation as follows: 




Q. And tell the jury with regard to those terms, what is the connotation, 
you've talked to patients and families about -- that are in deep trouble. What 
are those terms -- how do you see them being used? 
A. First of all, they're pejorative terms that no doctor should use. I mean 
nobody with any sensitivity wants to hear that their loved one is going to be 
a vegetable. Persistent vegetative state has been talked a lot about in the 
public. I prefer, if I'm talking to a family, to tell them, if it's true that 
recovery is very unlikely, I will say that. And that there's any range of 
possibility that the person could become dependent or have a very bad 
outcome, but I certainly wouldn't use those terms of persistent vegetative 
state or vegetable or mentally retarded. I just don't think that's part of the 
medical or neurological lingo. 
Q. And I understand you have to accept the testimony that you've read as 
true, 
but assuming that those terms are used, how do you think it would have 
an impact on the overall care and treatment of Lori? 
A. Yes, I think it adversely impacted the subsequent decision to halt 
resuscitation. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And also to not do a cricothyroidotomy or tracheostomy. 
(R. 4310 at p. 469, I. 8 top. 470, I. 15.) (Emphasis added.) 
At the end of his direct examination, Dr. Ginsberg explained what Dr. Peterson 
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should have done rather than tell Lori's family that she had a very poor prognosis: 
A. Well, as I said, I think what would have been appropriate was to have 
told 
the family that many patients with this condition can recover. Some patients 
recover within three to four days, some patients can take as long as ten to 
14 to 21 days to recover. There's a bell curve here in the middle of the bell 
curve is, you know, a recovery time of four or five days out along the 
distant part of the bell curve, 20 days, maybe some patients who have very 
light coma recover faster. But I think that what was not told to the family 
was that the outcome here is potentially very good and we should continue 
to support Lori. 
(R. 4310 at p. 471, 11. 4-17.) 
Dr. Ginsberg also testified that Lori was "eminently salvageable" on September 8, 
that she just needed more time to recover, and that there was a "very good chance that she 
would eventually wake up and probably leave the hospital." (R. 4310 at p. 456, 1. 1; p. 
460, 11. 11-17.) 
Thus, in his trial testimony, Dr. Ginsberg established the required causal link 
between Alta Wimmer's decision to stop Lori's resuscitation and the negligent advice of 
Dr. Peterson, Lori's neurologist. His evidence was sufficient to create a jury question. 
Even though Dr. Ginsberg said that Dr. Peterson's advice "indirectly" caused 
Lori's death, that does not defeat plaintifrs proximate cause case. First, Dr. Ginsberg's 
perception of what is a "direct" cause may differ from the jury's. Expert witness 
~ testimony can be helpful on the issue of proximate cause, but it cannot usurp the jury's 
role. Dr. Peterson certainly had a direct, face-to-face conversation with Alta about Lori's 
poor prognosis. As a result of that conversation, Alta stopped further resuscitation efforts. 
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A reasonable jury could conclude that such a conversation was a direct cause of Lori's 
death. 
Second, even if Dr. Peterson's advice to Alta was not a direct cause of Lori's 
death, it "set in motion events that produced the harm in a natural and continuous 
sequence" by causing Alta to make the decision to halt resuscitation efforts based on the 
erroneous idea that Lori had no meaningful chance for recovery. It is natural and 
reasonable for lay persons such as Alta Wimmer to rely on the advice of a neurologist in 
determining whether a family member is going to awaken from a coma, and if they have 
a good chance of having a normal life. This is precisely the advice Dr. Peterson 
conveyed, according the plaintifrs trial witnesses, i.e., Alta, Teresa, Dr. Ginsberg, and Dr. 
Pandita. 
2. Teresa Moore. 
Teresa Moore (Lori's sister) testified at trial that Dr. Pandita suggested a 
tracheotomy to provide an airway for Lori, but that Alta Wimmer rejected the suggestion 
because she understood her daughter was already irreversibly brain injured, i.e., likely to 






Do you recall anything about - asking about a tracheotomy? Do you 
recall anything about that? 
He had talked to my mom about it. 
When was that? 
I - I can't recall. I'm sorry. I think it was before. I'm sorry, I'm 
really trying. 
That's okay. As best as you can recall is all you can do. 





And tell us as best as you recall what you recall hearing. 
That she was too swollen for them to get it down her throat and that 
they had to go through and make a hole. And -
Did your mom ask any questions in there? 
My mom said, "Well, what good will that do?" 
And he said, "Nothing. It won't change anything. She'll still be a 
vegetable." 
• (R. 4311 atp. 625, 1. 18 top. 626, 1. 15.) 
3. Dr. Pandita's Death Summary. 
Despite repeated denials on the stand at trial, Dr. Pandita's Death Summary 
explicitly described the details of the family conference with Alta and Teresa and 
specifically stated that Dr. Peterson felt Lori "could end up in a persistent vegetative 
state." The relevant excerpt of the Death Summary reads as follows: 
The family arrived meanwhile and we had a family conference, 
which included the mother and sister of the patient, the social worker, 
Brenda, Dr. Petersen [sic], and myself. Since Dr. Petersen [sic] had been 
following the patient closely over the course of several days, he felt that 
there was a progressive deterioration in her neurological status ... He felt 
that the prognosis was very poor, and the patient could end up in a 
persistent vegetative state." 
(Defendant's Exhibit 1, at 000338.) (Emphasis added.) 
Dr. Pandita, in his trial testimony, admitted to writing the foregoing words in his 
Death Summary. (R. 4310 at 403.) 
Thus, plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence by the testimony of 3 witnesses to 
establish that Dr. Peterson's substandard medical advice regarding the condition of Lori's 
brain, delivered as Lori's neurologist, was "a cause" of Alta's decision to give up on 
resuscitation efforts for Lori. Accordingly, the question of proximate cause was for the 
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jury, and should not have been the subject of a directed verdict by the trial court. 
III. The Court Erred in Denying a New Trial Because It 
Committed an Error of Law Regarding General Damages. 
A new trial may be granted for several enumerated reasons, including "error in 
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7). 
Plaintiffs reason for requesting a new trial was because the directed verdict on 
general damages was an "error oflaw." If the appellate court agrees that it was error to 
grant directed verdict on general damages (see Argument, Point I, supra), then a new trial 
should also be granted due to this error in law. 
The trial court's application of an improper standard while considering the issue of 
directed verdict was demonstrated by several comments made from the bench during oral 
argument: 
1. "Thanks for dying. It hurts. I'm sad. But it's the best result for everybody." 
(R. 4313, atp. 35, 11. 21-22.) 
2. "There's no positive inference at all. I mean there's nothing positive in this 
relationship." (R. 4313, at p.35, 1. 24-25.) 
3. "[M]om and dad walk out with crocodile tears and all this money." (R. 
4313, at p. 38, 11. 4-5." 
4. "But this is an in-your-face argument, and it's not being taken very well by 
this Court. I'm indulging it. I'll take it. But I'm telling you, you're out of order and 
you're offensive and you don't need to be .... But the way you're presenting it, it's 
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like-the Court's either going to just be shamed into adopting your-or it will dig in its 
heels and say to heck with you. I don't care how good your argument is." (R. 4313, at p. 
25 1. 22 top. 26, 1. 8.) 
5. "[T]hat child has been nothing but a source of frustration, expense, anger 
(t and heartbreak to that parent. ... now this child who has been strung out on dope and 
drugs and crime for 25 years is now in the hospital, the victim of some wrongful act." 
(R. 4313, at p. 28, 11. 7-9, 18-20. 
It would be appropriate for the trial court's error in law to be rectified on appeal. 
IV. The Court Erred in Admitting Evidence that Lori Left 
The Hospital on September 1 Against Medical Advice. 
A. The Intervening Negligent Acts of Drs. Pandita and Peterson 
Broke the Chain of Proximate Cause for Lori's Actions. 
Utah courts apply the doctrine of intervening negligent act, also known as 
e superseding cause. "An intervening cause is an independent event, not reasonably 
foreseeable, that completely breaks the connection between fault and damages." Breton 
v. Clyde Snow & Sessions, 2013 UT App 65, ,r 9 299 P.3d 13. The court can decide as a 
matter oflaw whether an intervening act breaks the chain of causation. "[A]lthough 
intervening cause inquiries are typically fact-intensive, they too can be decided as a 
matter of law." Id. at ,r 10. This doctrine relieves a party from liability when a 
subsequent tortfeasor commits an unforeseeable negligent act causing harm different than 
the harm caused by the first party. Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 
482, 487-488 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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In determining foreseeability, Utah law advises that "the appropriate inquiry 
focuses on the specifics of the alleged tortious conduct, such as whether the specific 
mechanism of the harm could be foreseen." Dee v. Johnson, 2012 UT App 237,, 5,286 
P.3d 22 (internal quotations omitted; emphasis in original.) 
In this case, the specific mechanism of harm to Lori at the time of her death on 
September 8, 2004 was much different from the high blood sugar and diabetic 
ketoacidosis (DKA) for which she went to the emergency room on September 1 and 
September 2. The mechanism of harm on September 8, which caused Lori's death, was 
Dr. Pandita's mismanaged extubation and intubation, during which he was "fussing 
around" with a bronchoscope rather than quickly removing Lori's breathing tube and 
bagging her, when he discovered that the tube was sending air to her stomach rather than 
her lungs. (See Facts.) 
Essentially, the mechanism of Lori's death on Sept. 8 was asphyxiation with a 
tube in her throat, not any sort of disease process she had on September 1 or 2. 
This type of death at the hands of a doctor was unforeseeable, even to other 
doctors. Dr. Hasleton (the doctor who noted Lori's departure against medical advice) 
testified that he never warned patients about the possible risk of death at the hands of a 
health provider: 
Q. As I understand it, of the risks that you told [Lori] about, one of the 
risks that you did not include was that she was- by leaving, was 
risking substandard care, substandard medical care in the future, you 
didn't tell her that, did you? ... 
A. It's not written. 
Page 48 of 63 
Q. Is that one of the normal complications of hyperglycemia, 
substandard medical care? ... You told her the normal risks ... But 
you dido 't tell her that one of the known complications or 
anticipated risks was injury or death at the hands of the health 
provider, did you? 
A. That's not a complication I tell anybody. 
(R. 4309 at p. 114, 11. 3-25.) (Emphasis added.) 
Moreover, Dr. Pandita noted that Lori's diabetic ketoacidosis (DK.A) "had 
completely resolved" by September 7. (Defendants' Exhibit 1 at 000338.) Thus, the 
specific mechanism of harm related to her departure-namely her diabetic issues-had 
"completely resolved" by Dr. Pandita's own admission, and could not play a part in the 
later harm he caused by with the medical instruments he was using. 
Finally, Lori was unconscious, in a coma, and incapable of purposeful movement 
on September 8. She could not have been at fault for any action she took in relation to 
her condition on September 8. One might just as well attribute fault to any unconscious 
entity. 
In other words, it was true that Lori was treated for a disease-diabetes-on 
September 1st and again on September 2nd, but it was Dr. Pandita's negligent use of 
medical instruments-misplaced breathing tubes, bronchoscopes, bag masks-that cut 
off the air to Lori on September 8 and caused her death. 
Thus, Dr. Pandita's unforeseeable negligence, involving a different specific 
mechanism of harm, broke the chain of proximate causation arising from Lori's 
September 1st ER departure. As a result, admission of evidence about her departure was 
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error, and merits reversal. 
B. Utah Follows the Majority Rule: A Patient's 
Pre-Treatment Negligent Conduct Does Not 
Excuse the Doctor's Negligent Treatment~ 
Essentially, the defendants wish to blame Lori for her pre-treatment conduct, 
namely walking out of the hospital against another doctor's advice, and getting sick, 8 
days before Dr. Pandita's botched re-intubation. 
The Utah Supreme Court has rejected this theory. The Utah Supreme Court was 
asked to answer the following certified questions from the US District Court: 
(1) whether, under Utah law, the negligent acts of a plaintiff in causing or 
contributing to the situation that the plaintiff hired a professional to 
resolve can be the basis for a comparative or contributory negligence 
defense, and (2) whether, under Utah law, a plaintiffs negligent acts in 
causing or contributing to the situation the plaintiff hired a professional 
to resolve can be considered in determining causation and damages. We 
answer both questions "no." 
Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins, 2000 UT 21,, 1,996 P.2d 531. (Emphasis added.) 
The Steiner Court held as follows, citing the specific example of doctors: 
[W]e conclude that a preexisting condition that a professional is called 
upon to resolve cannot be the cause, either proximate or direct, of the 
professional's failure to exercise an appropriate standard of care in fulfilling 
his duties. To decide otherwise would allow professionals to avoid 
responsibility for the very duties they undertake to perform. See Steiner II, 
135 F .3d at 692. A doctor, for example, might be able to avoid liability 
for negligently treating an injured person because the patient 
negligently had run a traffic light and was injured. Such a result would be 
clearly unsound. 
Steiner, 2000 UT 21 at, 7. (Emphasis added.) 




The Utah Supreme Court's reasoning follows the majority rule regarding 
pre-treatment conduct. The Oregon Court of Appeals recently set forth the majority rule: 
" ... In sum, given that the focus in medical malpractice claims is on the 
negligent acts or omissions of the medical provider, it is inappropriate to 
use the patient's negligence that led to the condition that required 
medical attention to excuse the defendants' failure to meet the accepted 
standard of care. A patient who negligently injures himself is 
nevertheless entitled to subsequent nonnegligent medical treatment, 
and, if it is not provided, the patient is entitled to recover damages for the 
consequences of that negligence .... 
. . . [O]ur conclusion is that the plaintiffs action must relate to the 
negligent treatment because, as a matter of law, conduct that merely 
creates the need for medical treatment cannot cause the type of harm 
at issue in medical malpractice cases-the injury resulting from the 
malpractice .... 
Our conclusion is in line with the majority of other jurisdictions 
that have dealt with this issue .... [T]he defense is inapplicable when a 
patient's conduct provides the occasion for medical attention, care, or 
treatment which later is the subject of a medical malpractice claim or when 
the patient's conduct contributes to an illness or condition for which the 
patient seeks the medical attention, care, or treatment on which a 
subsequent medical malpractice claim is based." 
Son v. Ashland Community Healthcare Services, 239 Ore. App. 495,244 P.3d 835, 843-
844 (Or. App. 2010) (internal quotations, ellipses and citations omitted), 
In the present case, Lori's departure from Cottonwood Hospital's Emergency 
Department on September 1 constituted pre-treatment activity which Drs. Pandita and 
Peterson are barred by law from attributing to Lori. Therefore, it was legal error to admit 
~ such evidence, and the trial court's ruling should be reversed. 
C. Lori Cannot Be Held Comparatively Negligent Because 
Her Negligence Is Not Causally Connected to Her Injury. 
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Comparative negligence can be employed as a defense only if that negligence is 
"causally connected" to the injury. Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins, 2000 UT 21,, 1, 
996 P .2d 531. See, Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P .2d 728, 730 (Utah 1984 ). See also, 
Matthews v. Williford, 318 So.2d 480,483 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975) (holding that a 
patient's conduct in contributing to his heart attack was not the "proximate cause" of the 
patient's death); Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 236 Neb. 1,459 N.W.2d 178, 
186 ( 1990) (holding that the patient's negligence must have been "an active and efficient 
contributing cause of the injury"); Boeke v. International Paint Co. (Cal.), Inc., 27 Wash. 
App. 611,620 P.2d 103 (1980); Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439,618 P.2d 788 
(1980). 
"Proximate cause is 'that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence ... 
produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred."' Bansasine v. 
Bodell, 927 P.2d 675, 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Utah courts have consistently 
recognized that a "more recent negligent ... act may ... relieve the liability of a prior 
negligent actor under the proper circumstances ( citations omitted). These circumstances 
arise when the more recent negligent ... act was unforeseeable to the first negligent 
actor." Id., at 677. 
Simply put, Lori's death by a botched re-intubation on September 8th was not 
within the foreseeable risk of leaving the emergency room on September 1st• See 
Bansasine at 678. "Injuries have countless causes, and not all should give rise to legal 




liability" (citing W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts§ 42, at 273 
(5th ed.1984)). Instead, "'the law ... declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain 
point."' (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 
1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting); Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2001 UT 74, ,r 30, 171 P.3d 411 
~ (Wilkins , J ., concurring and dissenting). 
Proximate cause is a legal limit to liability, "which precludes recovery for a 
negligent act that may be part of a chain of events eventually leading to an injury, but still 
[is] too remote to warrant holding the negligent party liable for the injury." Proctor v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp., 2013 UT App 226, ,r 13,311 P.3d 564. 
The conduct of Lori Wimmer on September 1st is too remote, both in time and in 
~ 
mechanism of action, from the actions taken by Dr. Pandita on September 8th· While Lori 
had a disease involving high blood sugar, which may have been affected by her departure 
@ from the hospital, Lori's error was a sin of omission. By contrast, Dr. Pandita's errors 
were sins of commission and did not involve a disease process, they involved medical 
equipment that he did not use properly. He removed Lori's breathing tube too soon. He 
attempted to re-intubate Lori in a negligent manner. He belatedly realized the tube was 
misplaced in her esophagus. He failed to immediately remove the misplaced tube and get 
oxygen back to Lori's brain. More importantly, Dr. Pandita's errors caused death to Lori 
in a matter of minutes. It was prejudicial error for the court to allow such evidence to be 
available to the jury. 
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As the defendants have pointed out, in Harding v. Bell, the jury apportioned fault 
to the plaintiff due to her comparative negligence in failing to heed Dr. Bell's medical 
advice, engaging in the strenuous activity of cleaning horse stalls, and subsequently 
suffering a coronary artery problem. 2002 UT 108, 1 10, 57 P .3d 1093. 
However, the important distinction between Harding and Lori's case is that the 
Harding case involved post-treatment conduct relative to the negligent physician sued, 
whereas Lori's case involves pre-treatment conduct relative to the negligent doctors. In 
other words, Ms. Harding disregarded the advice of her treating physician, then turned 
around and sued him (i.e., Dr. Bell, who warned her about strenuous exertion, and whom 
she disregarded). In Lori's case, by contrast, she had nothing to do with Dr. Hasleton, 
who said she left against his medical advice. She has not claimed he was negligent, she 
has not sued him, she has left him alone. 
[S]ufficient evidence was introduced at trial to support the jury's conclusion 
that she was negligent. Specifically, the evidence admitted at trial showed 
that Harding knew of both the "abnormal" results from the ETT and the 
scheduled appointment with the cardiologist. The trial record further 
demonstrates that although Harding subsequently experienced "chest pain," 
including an "episode of ... severe ... chest discomfort," she waited 
several days before seeking medical attention and engaged in the strenuous 
physical activity of cleaning horse stalls. By itself, this evidence is 
sufficient to support the jury's finding that Harding was negligent. 
Harding's claim that there was insufficient evidence to find her negligent is 
therefore without merit. 
Id., at ,I 13. 
Ms. Harding's damages were apportioned with those of her original treating 
doctor, not a subsequent treating physician who engaged in some intervening act of 
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negligence, as the facts here indicate. Perhaps the Harding case would be a defense for 
the emergency room doctor (Hasleton), but neither Dr. Pandita nor Dr. Peterson treated 
Lori Wimmer on September 1st in the ER. 
This distinction between pre-treatment conduct and post-treatment conduct is 
i> consistent with the majority rule enunciated in the Steiner and Son cases. Patients cannot 
be apportioned fault for getting sick. They are entitled to non-negligent medical 
treatment, even if they were negligent in creating the situation that called for medical 
treatment. However, if they fail to obey a doctor's orders, they cannot turn around and 
sue that doctor without taking their share of fault. 
V. The Court Erred in Striking Charles 
Landers, M.D. As a Rebuttal Expert. 
A. Dr. Landers Is a Proper Rebuttal Witness under Utah Law. 
The trial court erred in holding that Dr. Landers' testimony was not proper 
rebuttal testimony and was cumulative of plaintiffs other experts. 
Rebuttal evidence is evidence tending to refute, modify, explain, or otherwise 
minimize or nullify the effect of the opponent's evidence. Board of Education v. Barton, 
617 P.2d 347,349 (Utah 1980). In Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993) the court 
ordered a new trial, stating that the testimony of an expert witness was "proper rebuttal 
Qi} evidence because its purpose was to minimize the effect of [ opposing party's expert 
testimony] and undermine the bases of his conclusions." Id., at 1338. 
Rebuttal evidence should be limited to evidence made necessary by the 
opponent's case-in-reply and evidence required to counter new facts 
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presented in the defendant's case-in-chief. The purpose of rebuttal evidence 
is not merely to contradict or corroborate evidence already presented but to 
respond to new points or evidence first introduced by the opposing party. 
Astill v. Clark 956 P.2d 108lat 1086 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Both Randle and Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, 29 P.3d 638 looked to Workman v. 
Henrie, 71 Utah 400,266 P. 1033, 1036 (Utah 1928) in opining that: "As a general rule, 
testimony presented for the purpose of rebuttal should be admitted, even if the rebuttal 
is somewhat repetitive of testimony on issues addressed during the case-in-chief." Randle, 
atl338 citing, Workman v. Henrie, 71 Utah 400, 266 P. 1033, 1036 (Utah 1928); Green, 
at if 23. (Emphasis added.) 
In Green, "[the Defendant's expert's] testimony was offered to explain and 
minimize the effect of [Plaintifr s expert 's] testimony ... [ and] was an important factor in 
the reconstruction of the accident. The testimony was not offered to rehash or repeat 
[Plaintifrs expert's] testimony. Even if somewhat repetitive, it was proper." Id. 
In Turner v. Nelson, 872 P .2d 1021 (Utah 1994 ), the court refused to admit the 
testimony of a rebuttal witness. The court's refusal to admit the rebuttal testimony in 
Turner differs from the present case because in Turner the appellant was attempting to 
admit evidence from an undisclosed witness. "The trial court excluded the testimony 
because it would unfairly disadvantage the defendant who had no notice of or opportunity 
to depose the surprise witness" Astill v. Clark 956 P.2d 1081, 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
"When the offering party contends that the undisclosed witness is necessary to 
rebut the adverse party's evidence, the issue hinges on whether the evidence 'sought to be 




rebutted could reasonably have been anticipated prior to trial'." (Emphasis in original.) 
Turner, at 1024. 
The facts here indicate that Dr. Landers was disclosed in the Disclosure of Expert 
Witnesses document filed by Plaintiff on June 15, 2009. Astill also distinguishes Turner 
in regard to expert witnesses who have been fully disclosed. "The elements of unfair 
prejudice and surprise associated with undisclosed witnesses are clearly not at issue 
[t]here." Id, at 1085 . 
Thus, Astill stands for the proposition that a party needs to reasonably anticipate, 
prior to trial, the testimony of her opposing party that will need to be rebutted and arrange 
for, and disclose to that opponent, to the expert who will testify. Here, Plaintiff did just 
that. She anticipated what rebuttal witnesses would be needed to counter defendant's 
experts, and rightfully named Dr. Landers as one of them, long before trial. 
B. Dr. Landers' Testimony Is Not Cumulative . 
Dr. Landers' testimony is not "needlessly cumulative" under Evidence Rule 403. 
"The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of ... needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 
403. 
It is the nature of rebuttal evidence that it addresses issues previously testified to in 
the case in chief of one or both parties. Its probative value is essential to plaintiffs case, 
not outweighed by a danger of being "needlessly" cumulative. Were it to be characterized 
at all as cumulative it would be needfully so in order to repeat and explain why an issue, 
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previously argued by both plaintiff and defense, should be decided for plaintiff rather 
than for the defense. 
Dr. Landers' opinion is that Dr. Peterson misled the Wimmer family when he told 
them that Lori's brain would not likely recover. He didn't distinguish between metabolic 
encephalopathy and encephalopathy caused by hypoxia. The reason that Dr. Landers' 
testimony was needed is that Dr. Peterson and Dr. Caplan, defendant's neurologist, have 
disclosed that they will repeat this misleading information to the jury at trial. The jury 
was entitled to hear Dr. Landers' opinion that the information was misleading and that 
giving such misleading information to a family considering termination of resuscitation 
efforts is a breach of the applicable standard of care. It is the nature of rebuttal testimony 
that it addresses an issue previously addressed in the case in chief by one or both parties, 
but it is not needlessly cumulative. 
The trial court in refusing to allow Dr. Landers' rebuttal evidence stated that Drs. 
Gins burg and Ali had already covered the same territory and thus it was cumulative. 
Plaintiff is not required to do more through Dr. Ginsburg or Dr. Ali than establish a prima 
facie case. See Astill at 1086. Plaintiff is not required in her case in chief to present a 
"pre- buttal" every defense that defendant's experts can or will make, even if those 
defenses are known to plaintiff. "[W]here a defendant introduces evidence of an 
affirmative matter in defense ... , the plaintiff, as a matter of right, is entitled to 
introduce evidence in rebuttal as to such affirmative matter." Id., at 1086. 
In Astill the court cites Turner in stating that "[It] will not reverse the trial court 
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unless the appellant demonstrates that the trial court has clearly abused its discretion and 
thereby affected the appellant's substantial rights." Astill, at 1084, citing Turner, at 1023. 
Here the trial court's actions have "affected the appellant's substantial rights." 
Both when the trial court granted a directed verdict and then later refused to grant a new 
El trial, the plaintiff lost the opportunity present the jury with her "points or evidence first 
introduced by the opposing party." As till, at 1086. "Whether a defendant introduces 
evidence of an affirmative defense or justification, plaintiff, as a matter of right, is 
entitled to introduce evidence in rebuttal as to such affirmative matter." Astill, at 1086, 13 
"Fundamental fairness requires that a party be permitted to introduce evidence to 
rebut inferences the jury can draw from the opposing party's evidence." Astill, at 1087. 
"The purpose of rebuttal evidence is not merely to contradict or corroborate 
evidence already presented but to respond to new points or evidence first introduced by 
the opposing party." Astill at 1086, (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ( emphasis added) 
Defendant Pandita contends that the opinions of Dr. Landers' "can serve only to 
'contradict or corroborate evidence already present' as specifically proscribed by Astill. 
However, this argument that Dr. Landers' testimony is repetitive of other expert 
witness such as Doctors Ali and Ginsburg does not lead to exclusion by the trial court. 
For if Dr. Landers' testimony had been admitted, the result might have been different. 
"Even though evidence sufficient to support the verdict was presented at trial, had 
[plaintiffs] rebuttal evidence been admitted, a different result may have been reached. As 
such, the error was prejudicial" As till, at 1087, 15-16 
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Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Landers be 
allowed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in this brief, the Plaintiff/Appellant respectfully requests 
that the Court reverse the trial court's two directed verdicts, its denial of a new trial, and 
its evidentiary rulings, and this case be remanded for further proceedings. 
r-JN.D 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~-- day of October 2014. 
MARTIN & PRITCHETT, P.A. 
w all 
Counsel for Defendants/ Appellants 
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Trial Transcript - Day Four 12/11 /2013 
TERESA MOORE , 
called as a witness for and on behal f of the 
plaintiff , being first duly sworn , was examined and 
testified as follows : 
THE COURT : Would you please sit in this 
chair . 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR . SCHLENDER : 
Q. For the record , Teresa, would you state 
your full name , p lease . 
here? 
A. Teresa Moore. 




In West Jordan , Utah . 
And have you moved -- were you raised 
I was . 
Q. Tell us , who is the members of your 
immediate fami ly now? 
A. My husband Robert --
MR . NEWHALL : Your Honor , I ' m having 
trouble hearing both the witness and the attorney . 
THE COURT : So am I . I don ' t think it ' s 
because of the equipment . If you could each stand 
closer to the microphone . 
MR . SCHLENDER : Thanks , Judge . Is that 



























Trial Transcript - Day Four 12/11/2013 
sometimes she'd just be a little off on how she was 
talking or walking, and then you knew there was 
something was going on with her. 
Q. So did you, after a period of time, 
connect it up that it was --
A. We did, then we knew when to -- if she was 
having a problem, we knew how to act with it and what 
to do for her. 
Q. 
A. 
What did you do? 
We'd get her a drink of orange juice, give 
her some candy, and if she wasn't too -- if it wasn't 
too bad, then she'd come out of it really quickly. 
Q. Were there times when she didn't come out 
of it as quickly? 
A. No, it usually took us maybe about five 
minutes or so to get her to snap out of it. Sometimes 









Was Lori married? 
For a short time. 
And she had -- was Megan her only child? 
She was. 
And in 2004, where was Lori living? 
At my mom's. 
And with Megan? 
Yes. 
. . ,, . 
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With your mom? 
Yes. 
And your mom is Alta, sitting here in the 
Yes . 
I want to just ask you now about the 




On September 2nd when she went to the 
hospital, what do you remember about that? Did you 






I talked to her that morning. 
That morning? 
Yes. 
And what did -- what was the context of 
I was just asking her how she was feeling. 
Okay. And what did she say? 







A. So I was done working for the morning so I I} 
told her I'd come over and -- to help her so -- you 
know, so I could help her feel better. 
Q. 
A. 
Was she going to go to work that day? 
No. 
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Q. The whole day on the 3rd? 
A. I did . 
Q. We re there other family members besides 
you t hat we re t here t hat day ? 
A. My mom, she came i n shortly after I did . 
My husband came for a few mi nutes . And I don ' t recall 
anybody else . 
Q. Was there a waiting room there or a place 
that you coul d go , or did you just have to stay in -her 
room? 
A. We just stayed in her room, unless they 
told us they were doing somethi ng with her that we had 
to leave f or . 
Q. You might slow down a little bit , let me 
finish my 
A. Okay , sorry . 








You were there the whole day . Did you eat 
We didn ' t leave for l u nch . 
You didn ' t leave? 
Huh-uh , no . 
Did you see any of the doctors that day? 
We did . 
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I don't. 
Okay. Was there any conversation at all 




With the doctor? 
Yeah. 
I was trying to understand why she was on 
a respirator and this particular doctor said he didn't 1 ~ 
~ 
know why she was on a respirator either, that she was i 
~ 
just sick and just needed to wake up. l i 
Q. Okay. And during the day this is the 
day after she's initially there; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At night? 
Was there anything unusual occurred that 
you recall at all with regard to Lori, her condition 
or anything that happened? 
A. Just that they had taken her off the 
medication to get her to wake up and all she was doing 
was kicking her arms around and her legs. And her 
eyes were opened but they were -- they were kind of 






And that's all she was doing. 
Okay. Was she in any way tied down? 




c ,.· .... 
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that because she would grab for the -- they were 
grabbing she was grabbing for the respirator . 
Q. Grabbing for the respirator? 
A. Yes . 
Q. The tube or --
A. The tube, uh-huh, yes . 
Q. Okay . And so how did they prevent that 
from happening? What was there, what did they use? 
A. Just these tie- downs they wrapped around 
each wrist and then around each of her ankles . 







So come that even i ng , you went home, I 
Well, I stayed until I had to go to my 
crossing and then I came back after my crossing was 
over with, then stayed until about 7 : 00. 
Q. You came back after what? 
A. After my crossing . I ' m a crossing guard 
and I cross in the morning and in the afternoon . 
Q. Okay . A guard crossing? 
A. Yes . 
Q. What is that? 
A. It ' s where you go out to the stop sign and 
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we ' re talking about , do you think? 
A. I don ' t know . I didn ' t see the video, 
Q. Okay . And , anyway, they were having a 
conversation about the respirator? 












And Dr . Pandit a j us t said , 11 We 11 , 11 and that I s a 11 that i 
was done . Dr . Pandita didn ' t go -- neither 
Dr. Pandita or the other gentleman went into any 
questions about the numbers that the therapist had 
just given t hem . 
Q. Okay . Was your mother there with you at 
that time? 
A. She was . 
Q. Okay . Were you two togethe r most of the 
time when you were there at the hospital? 
A. We were . 
Q. Could you -- was there any way you could 
take a break and you could go outside , anything of 
that kind? 
Yes. A. 
Q. Did you do that occasionally? 
A. We did . 
Q. Was it close by? Was there a door you 
could go out? 
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Okay. And was -- anyone e lse that 
My mom . 
Okay . And what do you remember -- I want 
you to just very carefully take us through the events 
now . 
What do you remember , the first thing of 
any importance with regard to Lori , that you recollect 
happening? 
A. She started moving on her own and I was 
absolutely excited . I walked out to the nurse and I 
just said -- I yelled at the nurse , I said for her to 
come here. 
And she came down and she said , "What? " 
And I said, "Look , look , she ' s moving on 
he r own . 11 I said , "Look , her arms are moving, her 
eyes are open ." I said , "Look what she ' s doing, it ' s 
so exciting ." 






She said what? 
She said, " I ' ve taken down the medicine . " 
They had taken down the medicine? 
Yeah , they had gone and brought down the 
medicine and they ' d been doing it every day to try to 
~-"·-' '·"-',;.t;;.c ..... -,, .. •, .,;;J. ✓'<.,4';;.,,,. •.~,...,-..._~ .. ~.4 .,.~.-. ,_,,.__.• •. ~,..~ . • - ,•.oMo 
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fine if we took her off the respirator . 
Q. All right . 
A. And he was so -- ma king us feel so secure 
with that decision t hat we didn 't feel at that time 
that we needed t o call my brothers. 
Q. You didn ' t need to cal l them? 
A. No , because he mad e us fe e l l i ke she was 
going to be fine , that there wou l d -- I didn ' t 
want something to happen to her a nd it be on my mom ' s 
shou lders a nd my s houlders . If something were to 
happen to my little sister , I wanted my brother s to be 
invol ved in t h i s ma j or decis i on on my sister ' s life . 
And he gave every indication that she was going to be 
fine 
Q . Okay . 
A. -- when she was be i ng taken off t he 
respi rator . 
Q. All r i ght . So what did t hey do -- what 
happened then? 





that is the best thing to be doing for Lori and you ' re , 
making us fee l so comfortable with what you ' re saying , 
then go ahead ." 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. And so what happened? 
He said it would be a little bit before 
, .~- - • J ........... . • 
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t ube gone? 
A. It was gone . 
Q. Okay . How· did Lori appear at this time? 
A. She was moving her arms all over , her legs 
all ove r , and she had this horrible breathing sound . 
It was just -- I can ' t even real ly explain it , it was 
just really a deep -- almost li ke she was gasping for 










Was there any doctors in the room then? 
No . 
Nurses? 
No . She came in probably about 15 minutes 
got back into the room . 
Okay . And s he ' s breathing this way? 
Yes . 
Okay . And what happened when -- did 
somebody come in or what? 


















breathing like that and she said, "That's the way that 1 
:1 
they always sound when you take out a " -- take the 
r espirator out . 
And I had said to her -- wit h her being a 
diabetic , I asked her if she could give her something 
to calm her down just a little bit to relax her 
because I was concerned o f her organs being affected 
- . -· ..... ~ -. - y---· 
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J 
" by bein g a diabetic . And she said that they cou ld not J 
(' 
do that , it would defeat the purpose . ~ ~ 
Q. What were you concerned about , what are 1 
you talking about? What was happening to he r? 
A . She was just thrashing over -- t hrashi ng 
so hard , and they had her arms down . 
Q. They were restrained? 
A . They were restrained and her legs , but she 
wa s just pulling so hard and she was bringing her head 
up really hard and just hitting it back down. And I 
' 
' ~ was just concerned being diabetic that it could affect 1 
her organs . 
And the nurse said that -- I said, "Well, 
how l ong could this happen? " 
Q. 
A. 
And she said , " For about 24 hours ." 
She said 
That she could be breathing and thrashing 
around like that for about 24 hours . And so I just 
said to her , "Why didn 1 t anybody tell u s that this is 
what we were going to be in for so we were prepared on 
what we were going to be see i ng with Lori? " 
And she didn ' t have an answer. 
Q. Okay . And at this time, who is t here, 
just you and mom? 
A. Just my mom and myself , and the nurse 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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Dr . Pandi ta , your mom . Anyone else? 
A. J ust myself . 
·Q . Jus t you? 
A . Uh-huh , yes . 
Q. And Brenda? 
A . Yes. 
Q. Okay . Tell us what happened next . 
A . Dr . Pandi ta looked over at my mom and he 
told my mom that things we r e not going well for Lori 
and t h at it was not l oo king good for her . 
And I said to him, " What h appened ? You 
told us that she wou ld be fine . What happened? " I 
don ' t understand how it changed so drastica l ly i n 
those few minutes , we didn ' t understand . 
And Dr. Peterson said that her brainwaves 
were low and it didn ' t look good and that in the state 1 
that she ' s in r ight now , that she was either going to ! 
be a vegetable or severely retarded . And t hat came 
i 
~ 
from Dr . Pandita . And then Dr . Peterson said the same ' 
thing . 
And I said, agai n - - my mom was more like 
in a state of shock, so she was j ust kind of sitting 
there shaking . 
And I said, " I want somebody to tell me 
i what happened here , because you gave us your word that 1 
' • 
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my sister was going to be fine . I don ' t understand 
how this has happened ." And I said , " I want you to 
explain yourself how this happened , I don ' t 
understand ." 
And my mom was still just sitting t here 
and shaking and crying . And they just said tha t 
everything was just not good with her and that this 
was a state that she was going to be in , e i ther a 









And you say -- who speci fically used those 
Dr . Pandita and Dr . Peterson . 
Both d i d? 
They both did . 
How about Brenda? 
Brenda did . Brenda, at that time, she was 










Okay . So Brenda didn ' t really say much at 
Not at that time . 
Okay . So how long did this go on , 
this meeting? 
A. It l asted for a few . They -- they asked 
-
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-- what she wanted -- with the state that 
Lori was in pertaining to the respirator, what they 
wanted my mom to do. My mom didn't know what --
Q. They asked her that? 
Yes. 
Who did? You say "they"? 
Dr. Pandita. 





A. About the respirator. And my mom said 
that she didn't know what she wanted to do, because 
she was just in a state of shock. 
And then Brenda said to her, "You wouldn't 
want your daughter to live like that, Alta. You 
wouldn't want your daughter to be a vegetable or 
severely retarded, you wouldn't want your daughter to 
live like that." 
And my mom said she wouldn't want her 
daughter to live like that. 







A. My mom just kept shaking and crying, and I ~ 
1
11 just -- I just kept saying, "I just don't understand, 
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On her - - wi th her hands ? 
Yes . And t hen there was a gentleman above 
her head. And she had blood all over her face , all 
over her mouth , down he r chin , and I was upset over 
that and I wanted to know where the blood was coming 
from, why she had blood on her . And I was pretty 
hysterica l and 
Q. So what happened next? When did you see 
Dr . Pandita? 
A. I didn ' t s ee him at any time of that going 
on . 
Q. Did there come a time when he came to talk 





Just my mother and I , no . 
Just the two of you? 
No . 
Do you recall anything about -- asking 





He had talked to my mom about it . 
When was that? 
I -- I can ' t recall . I ' m sorry . I think 
it was before . I ' m sorry , I ' m really trying . 
Q . That ' s okay . As best as you can recall is 
50 West jj{:.r~ Lake City, UT 84101 
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all you can do . 


















Q. ~ And tell us as best as you recall what you 1 
recall hearing . 
A. That she was too swol l en for t hem to get 
it down her throat and that they had to go through and 
make a hole . And - -






My mom said , "Well , what good will that 
And he said , "Not hing . It won ' t change 
She ' ll still be a vegetable . " 
Okay . What happened then? 
We were just -- my niece Rachel and my 
Rob were at the door , they were watching what was 
happening . More of the family was standing towards 
the back, and my mom was -- my mom had gone al l the 
way into t he room and she was over to the right , 
standing with the people . And my mom was crying 
hysterically and --
Q. Was Lori at this time moving or doing 
anything at all? 
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So did anybody say anything about 
Lori ' s -- d id they give you any -- anybody make a 
statement about what had happened now at t h is point? 
Did they say, " She ' s dead " ? 
A. No , they never said that she was dead . 
mom had just -- she can ' t keep going through this , 
that Lori couldn ' t keep going through thi s . And a l l 
of a sudden , eve rything just s topped , everybody 
stopped working on her . 
Q. Was there -- at this time when they 
stopped , was there still blood all over her? 
There was . 
And was the lady still up on top of her? 
She was starting to get off of her . 






A. Uh-huh . After everything was starting to 
stop , she got off for the gentl eman and they just told 
us we needed to leave . 
Q. Okay. So did you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What do you reca l l next , anything? 



































we could see her again when they had her cleaned up so , 
we d idn 1 t see her like that . And so we went in the :; 
' 
·- --· -- .. .__. ....... ."!,-- -
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other room and just waited for her - - for them to 
clean her up . And so when they were all done they 
came in and told us that we could come back into the 
room, and Dr . Pandita was i n there at the time . And 
they had said that he walked over and he checked he r 
vitals and he said that there was still a small 






He asked my mom what she wanted him to do . 
How long was it that you were gone while 
they cleaned her up? 
A. Probably a half hour or l ess maybe , 
something -- around a half hour . 
Q. So this is -- and this is after that time 
had expired? 
A. Yes , that was -- that she was completely 








So you came back? 
Uh-huh , yes. 
Was Dr . Pandita in the room when you came 
He was . 
And he told -- did he go over to Lori? 
_,., 
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A. He did. He checked her and he said there 
was still a small heartbeat, what would my mom like to 
do, and my mom just said to -- after this length, to 
let her go. 
Q. Was there any -- any other. personnel in 






Was there any machines or trach tubes or 
No, everything was shut off and out of the 





Lori was -- Lori's in the bed, as I 




Just up to her -- up to her armpits. 
Okay. And then what happened? 
We stayed with her and then came 
Dr. Pandita came back in and said that she was gone. 
So we stayed with her for a little and went back into 
the other room because Megan had not gotten there yet 
and my husband hadn't made it in time. So we went 
back in the room and waited for them to come and then 
told them that she was gone. 
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daughter and we went back into the room . And Megan 
walked over to her and put her head on her chest and 
just told her that she loved her and that she wished 
she would wake up . And then we just - - let Megan just 
stay with her for a little while and then we left the 
room . 
MR . SCHLENDER : That ' s all I have . Thank 
you . 
THE COURT : We ' ll take a recess now and - -
for about 10 or 15 minutes . We ' ll come back at 10 : 15 . 
As we take a break, I ' d ask you , members 
of the jury , not to form an opinion , do not discuss 
the case among yourselves , don ' t allow anyone else to 
discuss the case with you . Please rise for the jury . 
(The jury exited the courtroom . ) 
THE COURT : Court ' s in recess . 
(A recess was taken . ) 







Wimmer versus Pandita . • 
Ms . Moore , do you want to come back up? 
Who would like --
MR . WRIGHT : I ' ll --
THE COURT : All right . Mr . Wright. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR . WRIGHT : 
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Yeah , I don ' t recall anything e lse . 
Except what you ' ve already told us about? 
Yes. 
MR . SCHLENDER : I have no further 
THE COURT: Ms. Bassett? 
MS . BASSETT : No questions, Your Honor . 
THE COURT: Mr . Hobbs? 
MR . HOBBS: No questions . 
THE COURT : Ms . Garff, you may be excused . 
Thank you for being here . 
MR . SCHLENDER : We call to the stand Alta 
Wimmer . 
THE COURT : Ms . Wimmer , if you ' d come up 
and be sworn , please . 
THE CLERK : You do solemnly swear to tell 
the truth , the whole truth , and nothing but the truth , 
so help you God? 
ALTA WIMMER , 
called as a witness for and on behalf of the 
plaintiff, being first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR . SCHLENDER : 
Q. State your name , please. 
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A. 
doing as 
Well , they - - he indicated that she was 
you know , good, that she was doing fine 
with -- everything looked good on her . 
Q. Di d he use those words? 
A. It may not have been exactly those wo rds , 
but to the - - to the point that we knew that he was 
saying she wa s okay at that point . 
Q. Okay . And did you have a conversation 
with him at all that you recall? 
A. I don ' t remember exactly what was said at 
that particular time . I know that we were -- my 
daughte r asked him a lot of questions and I kind of 
listened more t han anything because I was I was 
having a really rough time with her illness, with 
he r how bad off she was . 
Q. What do you mean by 
A. Well , just the fact that she was in the 
ICU and sick . 
Q. And when you say "your daughter , " which 








Teresa , yes . 

































































After -- yes , yes , in that little side 
Little side room? 
Uh - huh. 
And tell us about that meeting . What do 















and we came back in and they said, "We ' ve been looking 1 i 
for you , where were you? " And we had told them where 
we were going, went out to take a break and have a 
sandwich because they ' d asked us to leave the room. 
And -- and so when we came back in , they 
took us in that room, and that 's when they told us 
that she was -- that she had taken a turn for the 







Who was it that --
Both doctors said that to us . 
Dr. 
Dr . Peterson and Dr . Pandita both told us 
Q. Is there any question i n your mind that 
both of them said it? 
A . No . 
Q. What was your reply, what was your 
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response? 
A. Oh , I was in a state of shock because it 
had only been like half an hour since they told us 
that s he was doing o kay . 
Q. And what did you say to h im? 
A. Well , I just I just told him, " I don ' t 
understand this , what could how she could turn so 
quick , how things could happen to her so quickly . " 
And they didn ' t really -- they didn ' t 
really say anything , to my recollection. 
you? 
Q. Okay . Now , was Brenda there at that time? 1 
A. Yes . 










So they weren ' t there very long in this --
No . No . 
Did they say anything other than - - about 
her condition other than that she could be a 
vegetable? 
A. Not that I recall . 
Q. Did they ask you anything about this , 
about 
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Not at that point. 
Not at that point? 
No. 
So they left? 
Yes. 
Did Brenda stay? 
She stayed in there, yes. 
And was Teresa still there? 
Yes. 



















Q. Tell me what happened then, if Brenda said ! 
anything. 
A. Well, she -- she -- she just kept patting 
me on the leg and said, "You wouldn't want her to live 
like this," and it just continued and continued and 
continued. And I was just -- as I said, I was in such 
a state of shock over everything that had happened and 
I was paying attention to what she was saying 
because -- she was more or less saying my daughter 
didn't have a·chance of any kind of a recovery, at 
least that's the opinion that I got from what she 
said. 
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Q. Did you ask her that or that ' s just what 
you got? 
A. Yeah , that ' s just what -- how I felt she 
was telling me that -- I felt like she was telling me , 
you should let her go . 
Q. Did she use any words such as "vegetable " 
or "vegetative " ? 
A . I don ' t recall her actually , other than 
what Teresa testified to, just to what she said . I 
don ' t recall her ever saying it, it was j ust 
constantly that I wouldn ' t want he r to live l ike that . 
Q . Okay . And did you reply to her at all and 





I don ' t -- I don ' t believe I did . 
Okay . What do you remember next 
We l l , I can ' t remember if they told 
somebody they needed to call the family or if Teresa 
just went out and did it . And they got there and I 
think -- I think all of them were there at one at 
one point in time . And Brenda ' s still sitting in 
there saying the same thing to me and -- and my son 
was -- "What ' s going on ," you know , because all of 
this had happened so fas t . 
Q . He was asking? 
50 W est Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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A. Yes. And then -- and then they called the 
code blue. And I didn't know at the time that that 
was for her because nobody had been in and told us 
anything. I mean we knew something was going on, but 




Dr. Pandita hadn't been in? 
No. So we just went back in the in 
the -- or went out and went and stood in the door and 
saw what they were doing with her and not 
understanding what -- still what -- exactly what was 
going on with her. 
Q. 






And was there anything said by Dr. Pandita 
Not that I recall. 
Not that you recall? 
And do you recall them doing CPR on her 
A nurse on top of her. 
On top of her. And you heard the 
testimony and I'm not going to ask you to go through 





MR. SCHLENDER: That's all I have. 
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here for --
(Discussion held off the record.} 
THE COURT: Lunch is going to be another 
15 minutes, at least, before it's ready, so we're 
going to go ahead with the next witness. Whose 
witness will this be? 
MR. SCHLENDER: The next witness will be 
Dr. Ginsberg. 
THE COURT: And who will be examining? 
You? 
Dr. Ginsberg, you may come up and be 
sworn, please. 
MR. NEWHALL: I'm sorry, there's an 
exhibit up here, we have to --
ARTHUR HENRY GINSBERG, M.D., 
called as a witness for and on behalf of the 
plaintiff, being first duly sworn by the clerk, 
examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SCHLENDER: 
was 




. ,·, ... : 
Arthur Henry Ginsberg. 
Where do you reside? 
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it's a reviewed study by your own peers and it ' s a 
reputable journal? 
Q. And does it have to relate to -- do these 
studies tha t you're going to talk about , do they 
relate specifically to the condition Lori had? 
A. Yes , they did . 
Q. Okay . 
A. I ' d like to just tell you very briefly 
about the two studies . And these are studies that 
were done quit e a long time ago, but they were two of 
the major studies done in diabetic ketoacidosis . 
One was done at the University of Basel in 
Switzerland in 1971 , where they looked at 58 patients 
wi th severe diabetic ketoacidosis , Lori ' s disease . 
And in that study, there was -- in the age group from 
below 40 , Lori was 33 , there were O -- there was 0 
mortality out of 19 patients that fell into that 
category . And even if you went up to 50 , there was 
only one mortality. So age predicted the ability to 
recover from t hi s disease . 
Now, in the second study, which was a very 
la rge study of 257 patients with ketoacidosis , and 
this was done at the University of Southern California 
by a very reputable group . The study was published in ,, 
the Journal of Diabetes and was a peer reviewed 
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article . 
Now , in these patients , the overall 
mortality rate of the 253 patients was 9 percent 
I ' m sorry, 13 percent . So that 87 percent of those 
patients recovered . They survived the diabetic 
ketoacidosis , 13 percent mortality. That ' s not 
inconsiderabl e for any disease , but i t certainly is 
not a lethal percentage when you have at least an 
83 percent chance of recovery . 
And remember , in the first study , if you 
were under the age of 40 , there were no mortalit ies at 
all. 
Now , what about the second study? The 
patients who tended to recover were lower age . They 
had BUNs in the range of 30 . They had no overwhelming 
blood infections . And they did not have a myocardial 
infarct ion ; in lay terms , a heart attack . They 
fulfilled all of those four criteria . 
So I think it ' s very important to know 
about studies like that . 
Now , in fairness, those patients were not 
fol lowed or not reported in the journal article . They 
were mainly interested in who died and who survived . 
Based on my experience of many , many years of having 
taken care of diabetic ketoacidosis , a majority of 
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patients survive and go back to having a relatively 
full life with normal activities of daily living . 
Q. Now , would this be patients that presented 
t o have the same or similar physical conditions , 
et cetera , as Lori? 
A. Yes . 
Q. And would they -- the condition she was 
in , you understa nd the underlying problem was quickly 
r esolved? 
A. Let me just address that briefly , if I 
may . 
Q . Sure . 
A. So you ' ve already heard that t he blood 
abnormalities corrected within about 48 hours . The 
sugar came down , the ketones came down. They looked 
carefully for liver disease and renal disease, didn ' t 
find it . She didn ' t have a myocardial infarction . So 
the blood abnor malities normalized . 





ketoacidosis for the brain and spinal fluid, which the t 
! brain rests Q. 
A. 
in , to lag behind the blood . 
How long? 




to even 10 to 14 days . 1 
So diabetic ketoacidosis in Lori was an 
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eminently salvageable si tuation . She ne eded more time 
to equilibrate in her s pinal fluid and her brain . And 1 
'! 
I t hink it ,. s very important , based on those studies, 
to know that a high majority of these patients , 
especially wi t h the four factor s that pertained to 
Lori , had a fairly high chance of living through this 
condition . 
Q. How would you characteri ze , Doctor , the 
state we ' ve heard referred to as various things, as 
between September 2nd and September 8th? 
A. I could do that . I think it ' s a confusing 
topic . 
In order to be conscious, you have to have 
two things, all of us. We have to have arousal . That 
means our brain is awake . That comes fr om the 
bra instem, from the very primitive part of t he brain . 
Without that, you can ' t have consciousness . 
Lori maintained brainstem function 
throughout her hospit a lization . 
The other thing you need besides arou sal 
is awa r eness . Awareness to the environment around 
you ; visual, audito ry , tactile , olfactory , stimuli 
that we all have that come to us through our five 
-- . - ··- -
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individual . 
Q. Would it ta ke days , weeks? How long do 
you have here to look at it? 
MR . HOBBS : Again , Your Honor , objection . 
This . witness cannot discuss t he lengt h and effect of 
these medications , as we discussed during the break . 
MR . SCHLENDER : Let me rephrase it . 
BY MR . SCHLENDER : 
Q. As of the September 8th , do you have an 
opinion as to whethe r or not Lori could have awakened? 
A. Oh , I definitely think Lori was eminently 
salvageable as of September the 8th . 
Q. 
A. 
What do you mean by that? 
By that I mean that given more time and 
proper management , as she had been getting , that there 
was a very good chance that she would eventua lly wake 




Have you seen that occur? 
Oh , man y times . 
And let ' s talk about the study . I want to 
go back -- Dr . Peterson talked about some studies that 
he had relied upon or that he had read and that he had 
talked to the family about . Do you recall that 
testimony? 
A . I do . 
50 Wels~1r: ;;~lit Lake City, UT 84101 
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degree of -- reasonable degree of medical certainty? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes , sir . 
And are those opinions with respect to the 








Q. 1 And the standard of care applicable to the 1~ 
i doctor would be what ? 
A. My opinion is that there was a breach of 
the standard of care by Dr . Peterson that indirect ly 
resulted in a very negative feeling for Teresa Moore 
and for Lori ' s mom when they were asked by Dr . Pandita 
whether or not they should do a tracheostomy or 
attempt to put the breathing tube b ac k in . 








of care there that indirectly resulted in Alta Wimmer j 
stopping the resuscitation where it was . And I think 
had Dr . Peterson gone to Dr . Pandita before that 
meeting a nd said , wait , this is too early , really , to 
do anyth i ng. We need to keep everything going and I 
want to tell the family that we can ' t make any 
progn osis and we ' re certainly not going to give t he 
kind of grim prognos i s that was given , where there was 
' 




And again , I ' m not in position to 
j 
a say t 
whether that was said or not . That ' s based on the 
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~ 
t e stimony , bu t I thi nk that was indi rectly res ponsib le ; 
for Alta Wimmer wanting to give up . 
Q. And that was. the advice t ha t what? What 
had been said that - -
A. We l l , I think what had been sa i d was that 
i t was going to be very difficult f or her to have any 
kind o f meaningful r ecovery . 
Q. Di d you read i n the depos i tions the word 
"vegetable " had been used? 
Yes . 





Q. And tell t he jury , wi t h rega r d to those 
terms , what is t he connotat i on? You ' ve ta l ked to 
patients and f amilies about - - that are in deep 
trouble. What are t hose terms -- how do you see them 
being used? 
A. Fi r st o f all , they ' re pejorat i ve terms 
that no doctor s houl d use . I mean nobody with any 
sensitivity want s t o hear that their loved one i s 
going to be a vegetable . 
Persistent vegetative state has been 
talked a lot about i n the pub l ic . I pre f er, if I ' m 
talking to a fami ly , to tell t hem if it ' s true that 
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there's any range of possibility that the person could 
become dependent or have a very bad outcome, but I 
certainly wouldn't use those terms of "persistent 
vegetative state" or "vegetable" or "mentally 
retarded." I just don't think that's-part of the 
medical or neurological lingo. 
Q. And I understand you have to accept the 
testimony that you've read as true, but assuming that 
those terms are used, how do you think it would have 
an impact upon the overall care and· treatment of Lori? 
A. Yes, I think it adversely impacted the 




And also, to not do a cricothyroidotomy or 
tracheostomy. 
Q. And you understood that --
MS. BASSETT: Objection, Your Honor. 
These sound like opinions of -- of Dr. Pandita. 
Dr. Peterson was not involved in the code where there 
were discussions about that. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. SCHLENDER: Sure. 
BY MR. SCHLENDER: 
Q. At the time that the family discussions 
were going on that has been talked about, Doctor, what 
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would have b e en , within the sta ndard of care , 
a ppropriate to have told the family that you believe 
was not told? 
A. Well , as I said , I think what woul d have 
~ 
• n j ; 
I~ 
1!~ 
been appropriate was to have told the family that many 1 
' 
patients with this condition can recover . Some 
patients recover within three to four days , some 
patients can take as long as 10 to 14 to 21 days to 
recover . 
There ' s a bell curve here . In the middle 
of the bell curve is , you know , a recovery time of 
four or five days . 
bell curve, 20 days. 
Out along the distant part of the 
Maybe some patients who have 
very light coma recover faster . But I think that was 
wh a t was not told to the family was that the outcome 
here is potential l y very good and we should cont i nue 
to support Lori . 
MR . SCHLENDER : Thank you. That ' s all . 
THE COURT : Mr . Hobbs? 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR . HOBBS : 
Q. Good afternoon, Dr . Ginsberg . 
A. Good afternoon . 
Q. Before we get i nto the opinions you 
e xpressed , le t me just conf irm and make sure of the 
' i 
.,:,a....,Qll,O,.I,,_:-, ~ .i 




PATIENT: WIMMER, LORl ANN 
PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIAN: . PHYSICIAN NOT CHOSEN 
DATE OF ADMISSION: 9/2/2004 
DATE OF DEATH: 9/8/2004 
CHIEF COMPLAINT: Diabetic ketoacidosis. 
HISTORY OF ILLNESS: This was a 33-year-old female who had history of type 1 diabetes on an insulin 
pump, who had presented to emergency room one day prior to hospitalization and was found to be in diabetic 
ketoacidosis. Patient was treated in the emergency room with IV fluids and insulin, however, patient left against 
medical advice and returned on the day of admission with significant vomiting and was found to be in severe 
acidosis and ketosis secondary to diabetes. The patient was significantly agitated and in respiratory distress in 
emergency room and was intubated emergently. Patient's initial laboratory data showed a sodium of 127, 
potassium of 6, a chloride of 90, bicarbonate of 7, glucose of 1112, BUN of 34, creatinine of 1.8, and 'WBC 
count was 21.6, and she had a pH of 6.87 which was done after she was intubated and she was on the ventilator. 
Patient also had significant ketosis with serum ketones greater than 80. Patient was managed in the ICU and 
started on N fluids and IV insulin. Antibiotics were started. For the rest of the details of the initial history and 
physical, please see my detailed dictated note on September 2, 2004. 
HOSPITAL COURSE: The patient's diabetic ketoacidosis and renal insufficiency improved with aggressive 
hydration and insulin therapy. Patient was found to have elevated cardiac enzymes and a cardiology evaluation 
was obtained and Dr. Madsen saw the patient. He did not feel that the patient was having acute myocardial 
injury, however, echocardiogram was done which showed nonnal systolic and diastolic function. While patient 
improved medically, patient's neurological status continued to be poor. She was intennittently agitated, needing 
continuous sedation. A neurology consultation was obtained and Dr. Petersen saw the patient on September 5, 
2004, and he felt that the patient had metabolic encephalopathy due to diabetic ketoacidosis and other metabolic 
factors, including severe acidosis at the time of admission. An EEG was obtained which showed a slow 
response with electrical activity of 4-5 Hz and no epfleptiform waves. Dr. Petersen felt that the patient had a 
poor prognosis based on the overall clinical status as well as the EEG findings. I saw the patient again on 
September 7, 2004, and the patient's diabetic ketoacidosis had completely resolved, but she continued to be 
comatose. Patient was still on sedation at this time, and it was unclear whether some of the effects may be due 
to sedation. However, she was not needing significant support from the mechanical ventilator and we started 
weaning her on the ventilator and was switched to presser support. I spoke at length with the family on 
September 7, 2004. I inforn1ed them the patient's clinical status had improved in respect to her diabetes, renal 
failure as well as respiratory failure. However, her neurological function was still poor and it was unclear as to 
whether some of this could be due to sedation. I inforn1ed them that we would try to discontinue the sedation 
and then assess her underlying neurologic response. On September 8, 2004, patient had been on CP AP of 5 for 
significant length of time and her blood gases looked good. She had a good gag reflex. It was hard to keep her 
off the sedation and at the same time keep her intubated as well. I felt it was important not to restart the sedation 
to know her underlying response. Since she had been on minimal support on the ventilator) I thought it 
reasonable to try and extubate her and see if all her agitation was due to her being intubated and whether she 
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would not need any subsequent sedation. We extubated her subsequently. The family arrived meanwhile and 
we had a family conference, which included the mother and sister of the patient, the social worker, Brenda, Dr. 
Petersen, and myself. Since Dr. Petersen had been following the patient closely over the cow·se of several days, 
he felt that there was a progressive deterioration in her neurological status. This was especially the fact that 
patient had not received any sedation and did not have any purposeful response. He felt that the neurological 
prognosis was very poor, and the patient could end up in a persistent vegetative state. The mother infom1ed us 
that the patient had clearly indicated that she did not want to end up in a vegetative state. However, the famil y 
was not ready to withdraw care at this point and felt that they needed some more time to reach that decision. 
Around the same time, the patient started having increasing stridor and respiratory distress. A clinical decision 
was made to reintubate the patient while the family could reach decision as to the ft.uther level of care. Patient's 
vocal cords were very hard to visualize, and there was significant mucosa! edema around the larynx. We staited 
bag ventilation on the patient and saturations remained in the range of90% and about. I immediately called for 
assistance with intubating the patient. Dr. Eric Smart, the emergency room physician, arrived and attempted to 
intubate the patient without success. Assistance .from in-house anesthesiologist was requested. I again 
attempted to intubate the patient with the help of a bronchoscope without success. We again started bagging the 
patient. A blind attempt at intubation was suggested and this was done by Dr. Smart. Meanwhile a tracheotomy 
kit had been requested and was brought in. The anesthesiologist arrived and felt that the chest movement 
seemed symmetrical and it was likely that the tube placement was okay. However, bagging the patient the 
saturations did not come up and patient started becoming bradycardic. Until this time, the patient had 
maintained reasonable saturations as well as blood pressure and pulse rate. Patient was given Atropine and 
epinephrine and CPR was begun. I met with the family again and infom1ed them about her events and about the 
initiation of CPR. The mother was thinking about stopping !he CPR but could not reach a decision. We 
continued with the CPR and I did a quick bronchoscopy to visualize the placement of the tube and realized that 
this was an esophageal placement. The tube was withdrawn and anesthesiologist was making an attempt to 
place an endotracheal tube. While this was underway, the patient's mother came in and requested us to stop 
CPR. Given the poor neurologic status to begin with, I felt this was reasonable and decided to stop the CPR. 
Patient expired soon after and was declared dead at 1338 hours. 
FINAL DIAGNOSES: Diabetic ketoacidosis with coma . 
SP/er DD: 09/22/2004 15:33:05 DT: 09/22/2004 15:49:28 VJ: 323970 DOC: 48536 
cc: FREDERIC M . CIVISH, M.D. 
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IN THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Alta Wimmer, for herself and for the heirs of 
Lori K. Wimmer, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Sunny Pandita, M.D. and David Scott 
Peterson, M.D., 
Defendants. 
Order on Defendants' Joint Motion for 
Directed Verdict 
Case No. 050910577 
Judge Paul Maughan 
Trial commenced in this matter on December 5, 2013, and Plaintiff rested her case on 
December 11, 2013. Defendants thereafter moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that 
Plaintiff had not proved economic damages, had not proved noneconomic damages, had not 
satisfied her burden of proving punitive damages, and, in the case of Dr. Peterson, failed to prove 










a prima facic case of medical negligence with the absence of sufficient evidence to prove 
causation. Plaintiff stipulated to voluntarily dismiss claims for economic damages and to 
voluntarily dismiss the punitive damages claim against Dr. Peterson. The Court asked for fu1ther 
briefing on the remaining issues. Dr. Peterson submitted a brief suppo1ting Defendants' Motion 
for Directed Verdict. Dr. Panditajoined in the briefing and also argued that Plaintiff's claim for 
punitive damages against him should also fail. Plaintiff submitted memoranda in opposition. 
The Court, having heard oral argument and having reviewed the briefing submitted by the 
pa1ties, and for good cause appearing therefore, hereby enters the following ORDER on 
Defendants' Joint Motion for Directed Verdict: 
Damages 
Plaintiff bears the burden of proof to produce a sufficient evidentiary basis to establish 
the fact of damages, or that damages were actually incurred. See Oxendine v. Overtwf, 1999 UT 
4, ~ 19, 973 P.2d 417. lndeed, a plaintiff is required to prove both the fact of damages and the 
amount of damages. See Stevens-Henager College v. Eagle Gate College, et al., 201 1 UT App 
37, ~ 16,248 P.3d 1025, 1030, 255 P.3d 684 (Utah 2011) (citing TruGreen Cos. v. Mower Bros., 
2008 UT 81, ~ 15, 199 P.3d 929; Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 
P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985)). To establish the fact of damages, "[t]he evidence ... must give rise to 
a reasonable probability that the plaintiff suffered damage." Id. (quoting Atkin, 709 P.2d at 336; 
see also Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 176 (Utah Ct.App.1993) ("[A] 
plaintiff [must] prove the fact of damages by a preponderance of the evidence .... ")). "'While the 
standard for determining the amount of damages is not so exacting as the standard for proving 
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the fact of damages, there still must be evidence that rises above speculation and provides a 
reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages."' Id. ( quoting TruGreen, 
2008 UT 81, ~ 15, 199 P.3d 929 ( other citation omitted)). 1 The law requires that this evidence 
shall not be so meager or uncertain as to afford no reasonable basis for inference, leaving the 
damages to be detennined by sympathy and feelings alone. See Winsness v. M J. Conoco 
Distributors, inc., 593 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah 1979). The level of persuasiveness required to 
establish the fact of loss is generally higher than that required to establish the amount of a loss. 
See Atkin Wright & Miles, 709 P.2d at 336. 
Plaintiff does not seek to recover for economic damages in this matter and stipulated to 
dismiss her claim for economic damages with prejudice. Pursuant to that stipulation, the Court 
dismissed Plaintiff's claimed economic damages . As to Plaintiff's claim for non-economjc 
damages, the Court concludes that, although some degree of uncertainty is allowed to establish 
the fact of damages, the jury cannot be Ieft to mere speculation in making such an award. See id. 
There must be some proof of the loss of affection; loss of society, counsel, or advice; loss of 
comfort and pleasure the heirs would have received from the deceased; or loss of protection. See 
Winsness, 593 P.2d at 1306. In this case, Plaintiff presented no evidence as to her loss of society, 
love, companionship, protection and affection as a result of Lori Wimmer's death, and the jury 
would be left to mere speculation as to whether those losses were in fact suffered. 
I The Court takes no issue with the suggestion that model jury instruction CV2004 does not require the testimony of 
any witness to establish the amount of non-economic damages. Further, the Court agrees that the statute governing 
wrongful death actions, Section 78B-3-106, provides that "damages may be given as under all the circumstances of 
the case may be just" ( emphasis added). As explained herein, however, Plaintiff has failed to establish the fact of 
damages. As such, the Court finds that CV2004 and Section 78B-3-106 do not compel a case to proceed to the jury 
when plaintiff has failed to present evidence in support of her damage claims, so as to render the evaluation of 
noneconomic losses nothing more than speculative. · 






















The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs position that she presented sufficient evidence of the 
fact of her al leged non-economic loss during trial. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that she has 
presented testimony from decedent's sister, Teresa Moore, that Ms. Moore and the decedent 
were close to one another. This testimony is irrelevant because only a decedent's heirs are 
entitled to recover, and Ms. Moore is not an heir . 
Plaintiff further argues that evidence was presented at trial that decedent and her daughter 
Meghan Case lived with Alta Wimmer during decedent's life. Although this may be true, it says 
nothing about the loss of society, love, companionship, protection and affection allegedly 
suffered as a result of Lori Winuner's death, and is therefore insufficient to establish a claim for 
non-economic damages under Oxendine v. Overtwf Plaintiff also elicited testimony at trial 
concerning the events of the decedent's final hours at the hospital. The Court finds that such 
testimony is also insufficient as it fails to show how the decedent 's passing affected the lives of 
her heirs. Although Plaintiff presented testimony that Meghan Case told the decedent good-bye 
and that she hoped the decedent would wake up from her coma, Plaintiff presented no evidence 
at trial that Meghan Case actually suffered any non-economic loss from decedent's passing . 
Because Plaintiff presented no evidence of non-econornic damages, and because the 
parties stipulate that economic losses are not at issue, whether Plaintiff presented sufficient 
evidence to pursue a claim for punitive damages against Dr. Pandita is moot.2 See UCA § 78B-8-
20 l ( l )(a). Plaintiff must prove compensatory damages before punitive damages may be 
awarded. Because Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence of non-economic damages at trial, 
2 Plaintiff stipulated to dismiss punitive damages against Dr. Peterson. The Court entered an order dismissing 
punitive damages against Dr. Peterson on December 12, 20 I 3 . 
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and because economic damages and punitive damages are no longer at issue, Plaintiff has failed 
to present a prima facie case of medical negligence against either Dr. Pandita or Dr. Peterson. 
See Jensen v. IHC Hasps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, ii 96, 82 P.3d 1076 (holding that a plaintiff must 
establish all four of the following elements to prove a prima facie case: "(1) the standard of care 
by which the [physician's] conduct is to be measured, (2) breach of that standard by the 
[physician], (3) injury that was proximately caused by the physician's negligence, and (4) 
damages" (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' joint Motion 
for a Directed Verdict as to the issue of damages and ORDERS that all of Plaintiffs claims 
against Dr. Pandita and Dr. Peterson are hereby dismissed as a matter of law, with prejudice, and 
on the merits. 
Causation 
As an alternative basis for dismissal of Plaintiffs claims against Dr. Peterson, the Court 
concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish a causal link between Dr. Peterson's acts and 
Plaintiffs alleged damage. During trial, Plaintiff elicited testimony from her expert Dr. Ginsberg 
that Dr. Peterson's actions indirectly led to Alta Wimmer's decision to cease resuscitation effo1ts 
on the decedent. The Court finds that such an indirect effect is insufficient for Plaintiff to meet 
her burden pursuant to Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2013 UT App 226 at~ 10, 311 P.3d 
564 (noting "[p]roximate cause refers to the basic requirement that before recovery is allowed in 
tort, there must be some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct 
alleged" ( emphasis added)). In any event, Dr. Ginsberg is without sufficient foundation to testify 
regarding the rationale for Ms. Winuner's decision. 




















More importantly, Plaintiff Alta Wimmer offered no testimony at trial that Dr. Peterson 
influenced her decision to cease resuscitation efforts on decedent or that she relied in any way on 
Dr. Peterson's advice in making her decision regarding the decedent's care. In the absence of any 
competent evidence that Dr. Peterson's actions caused Alta Wimmer to cease resuscitation 
efforts on the decedent, Plaintiff cannot prove a prima facie case of medical negligence against 
Dr. Peterson. See Jensen, 2003 UT 5 l at ~I 96. Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Dr. 
Peterson's Motion for a Directed Verdict as to causation and hereby dismisses Plaintiffs claims 
against Dr. Peterson as a matter of law and with prejudice . 
Each pa1ty is to bear their own costs in this matter. 
Approved as to form: 
/s/ Nan T. Bassett 
Shawn McGarry 
Nan T. Bassett 
Attorneys for Sunny Pandita, M.D . 
S. Clark Newhall 
END OF PLEADING 
Attorney for Plaintiff Alta Wimmer and for the heirs of Lori K. Wimmer 
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Attorneys for Defendant David Scott Peterson, M.D. 
IN THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Alta Wimmer, for herself and for the heirs of 
Lori K. Wimmer, Order on PlaintifPs Motion for New Trial 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
Sunny Pandita, M.D. and David Scott 
Peterson, M.D., 
Defendants. 
Case No. 050910577 
Judge Paul Maughan 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial, filed on or 
about December 31, 2013. Defendant David Scott Peterson, M.D., filed a memorandum in 
opposition to Plaintiffs Motion on or about January 15, 2014, and Defendant Sunny Pandita, 
M.D., filed ajoinder in Dr. Peterson's opposition on or about January 15, 2014. Thereafter, 
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Plaintiff filed a reply memorandum in support of her Motion and submitted the matter for 
decision on January 22, 2014. The Court heard oral argument on Plaintiffs Motion for New 
Trial on March 18, 2014, and the matter is now ripe for the Court's ruling and order. 
Plaintiff moves this Court for a new trial on the sole basis that an error of law occurred 
when the Court granted Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7). 
The Court, having heard oral argument and having reviewed the briefing submitted by the 
parties, and for good cause appearing therefore, hereby enters the following ORDER on 
Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial: 
Plaintiff bears the burden of proof to produce a sufficient evidentiary basis to establish 
the fact of damages, or that damages were actually incurred. See Oxendine v. Overturf, 1999 UT 
4, ~ 19, 97 3 P .2d 417. Indeed, a plaintiff is required to prove both the fact of damages and the 
amount of damages. See Stevens-Henager College v. Eagle Gate College, et al., 2011 UT App 
37,116,248 P.3d 1025, 1030, 255 P.3d 684 (Utah 2011) (citing TruGreen Cos. v. Mower Bros., 
2008 UT 81, 115, 199 P.3d 929; Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 
P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985)). 
To establish the fact of damages, "[t]he evidence ... must give rise to a reasonable 
probability that the plaintiff suffered damage." Id. (quoting Atkin, 709 P.2d at 336; see also 
Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 176 (Utah Ct.App.1993) ("[A] plaintiff 
[must] prove the fact of damages by a preponderance of the evidence .... ")). "'While the 
standard for dctennining the amount of damages is not so exacting as the standard for proving 
the fact of damages, there still must be evidence that rises above speculation and provides a 
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reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages."' Id. (quoting TruGreen, 
2008 UT 81, ~[ 15, 199 P.3d 929 (other citation omitted)) . 
The law requires that this evidence shall not be so meager or uncertain as to afford no 
reasonable basis for inference, leaving the damages to be determined by sympathy and feelings 
alone. See Winsness v. M J. Conoco Distributors, Inc., 593 P .2d 1303, 1306 (Utah 1979) . 
When the Court granted Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict, Plaintiff immediately 
moved to re-open her case, recognizing that she had not presented evidence that she and/or 
Meghan Case had, in fact, suffered general damages. The Court denied Plaintiffs motion to re-
open and explained that it would not allow Plaintiff to remedy an error that had just been pointed 
out through Defendants' directed verdict motion. 
In granting Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict, the Court did not weigh the 
evidence but considered all reasonable inferences from the evidence that had been admitted. The 
Court found an absence of any evidence at trial to establish a recoverable loss, including but not 
limited to any evidence regarding financial support furnished; loss of affection, counsel, and 
advice; loss of the deceased's care and solicitude for the welfare of the family; or loss of the 
comfort and pleasure the family would have received. See Oxendine.1999 UT 4 at ~ 19; Switzer 
v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244,247 (Utah 1980). 
Indeed, Plaintiff presented no evidence regarding the loss of companionship, affection, or 
society from which reasonable inferences could have been made regarding the relationship 
between the deceased and her heirs. The evidence Plaintiff did present and to which Plaintiff 
cites as evidence of general damages does not establish a recoverable loss absent speculation . 
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Although Plaintiff presented evidence that the decedent and her daughter Meghan Case lived 
with Plaintiff Alta Wimmer during decedent's life, this evidence says nothing about the loss of 
society, love, companionship, protection and affection allegedly suffered as a result of Lori 
Wimmer' s death, and is therefore insufficient to establish a claim for non-economic damages 
under Oxendine v. Overturf. Plaintiff also elicited testimony at trial concerning the events of the 
decedent's final hours at the hospital. The Court again concludes that such testimony is also 
insufficient as it fails to show how the decedent's passing affected the lives of her heirs. If the 
Court had not granted a directed verdict in favor of Defendants, the jury would have been left to 
speculate regarding whether Plaintiff or decedent's heir in fact suffered a loss. 
Given the total lack of evidence to establish the fact of damages, the Court correctly 
granted a directed verdict in favor of Defendants. The Court therefore concludes that there was 
no error in law in granting Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict. Accordingly, the Court 
hereby DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial. In denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial, 
the Court also finds that Plaintiff assigned no error to the Court's additional basis for granting a 
directed verdict in favor of Dr. Peterson on the issue of causation; therefore, the Court also 
DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial to the extent the Motion seeks a new trial on the 
claims against Dr. Peterson. 
END OF PLEADING 











Approved as to form: 
/s/ Nan T. Bassett (with permission) 
Shawn McGan-y 
Nan T. Bassett 
Attorneys for Sunny Pandita, M.D . 
S. Clark Newball 
Attorney for Plaintiff Alta Wimmer and for the heirs of Lori K. Wimmer 
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SHAWN McGARRY - #5217 
NAN T. BASSETT - #8909 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Sunny Pandita, M.D . 
10 Exchange Place, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 841 11 
Telephone: (801)521-3773 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
ALT A WIMMER, for herself and for the 
heirs ofLORl K. WIMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
SUNNY PANDITA, M.D.; DAVID SCOTT 
PETERSON, M.D.; and, IHC HEALTH 
SERVICES, INC., dba COTTONWOOD 
HOSPITAL, 
Defendants . 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE FOR EXCLUSION 
OF "AGAINST MEDICAL ADVICE" 
EVIDENCE 
Civil No. 050910577 
Judge Paul Maughan 
The Plaintiffs Motion in Limine for Exclusion of "Against Medical Advice" Evidence 
came before the Couii for hearing on November 1, 20 l 3. The Court, having reviewed the 
briefing and having heard oral argument, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES the 
following: 
I. Plaintiffs Motion in Limine for Exclusion of "Against Medical Advice" Evidence 
is DENIED; 
-1-
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---
2. Medical records and other evidence referring to Lori Wirnmer's departure from 
Cottonwood Hospital "against medical advice" ("AMA") may be admitted into evidence; 
3. This Order is made for the reasons stated in Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion in Limine for Exclusion of "Against Medical Advice" Evidence and specifically, 
Whether Lori Winuner leaving Cottonwood Hospital AMA on September 1, 2004 was negligent 
and causative of her death goes to weight; 
4. The special verdict form may include a line for allocation of fault to Lori 
Wimmer; and, 
5. The parties shall each bear their own costs and attorney fees related to said 
motion. 
DATED this __ day of November 2013. 
BY THE COURT 
JUDGE PAUL MAUGHAN 
-2-











CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this 26th day of November 2013, the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE FOR EXCLUSION OF "AGAINST MEDICAL ADVICE" 
EVIDENCE was e-filed through the Utah State Court to the following: 
Clark Newhall 
LAW OFFICE OF CLARK NEWHALL MD JD 
57 West 200 South, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Lee Schlender 
SCHLENDER LAW OFFICE 
2700 Holly Lynn Drive 
Mountain Home, ID 8364 7 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Brandon B. Hobbs 
Robert Wright 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
299 S Main Street, 15 th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for David Scott Peterson, MD. 
/s/ Mikelle Ramirez 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALTA WIMMER, for herself and for 
the heirs of LORI K. WIMMER, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 050910577 
Pl aintiff, 
vs. 
SUNNY PANDITA, M.D.; BRENDA 
BLACKHAM, M.D.; DAVID SCOTT 
PETERSON, M.D . , and IHC HEALTH 
SERVICES, INC., dba COTTONWOOD 
HOSPITAL, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on June 15, 2011, 
in connection with defendant Sunny Pandita, M.D . 's Motion to Preclude 
Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert Stan Smith, Ph.D., Dr. Pandita's Motion 
in Limine to Preclude Charles Landers, M.D., as a Rebuttal Witness and 
defendant David Scott Peterson M. D. ' s Motion to Strike Dr. Landers' 
Testimony . At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter 
under advisement to further consider the parties ' written submissions, 
the relevant legal authority. and counsel's oral argument . 
fully informed , the Court rules as stated herein . 
Being now 
The Court first addresses Dr . Pandi ta' s Motion concern ing Dr. 
Smith' s testimony and expert opinions regarding a component of the 



















WIMMER V . PANDITA PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
" loss of the society or relationship." Dr. Pandita argues that Dr . 
Smith ' s opinions , based on a "value of life" model, does not meet the 
fundamental criteria for admissibility under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence and the standards for determining admissibili ty of technical 
or scientific expert testimony set forth in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 
388, 402-405 (Utah 1989) . 
The plaintiff's Opposition suggests that Dr. Pandita has misapplied 
both Rule 702 and Rimmasch, which applied a pre-2007 version of Rule 702 . 
However, in the recent case of Eskelson ex . rel. Eskelson v . Davis Hosp. 
and Medical Center, 242 P .3d 762, 766 (Utah 2010) , the Court recognized 
the continuing relevance of Rimmasch : 
In amending rule 702, the court did not intend to make it more 
difficult to admit expert testimony, but rather to clarify the 
requirements for admission. Aspects of the Rimmasch test 
continue to be applicable under amended rule 702. For example , 
rule 702(b) , like Rimmasch, requires a determination to 
determine whether a party has met its threshold burden to show 
the reliability of the principles that form the basis for the 
expert ' s testimony and the reliability of applying those 
principles to the facts of the case. And, similar to the 
Rimmasch standard, rule 702 (c) a llows the court to take 
judicial notice of principles that h ave been accepted by the 
relevant expert community . 
The advisory committee notes make clear that the new rule 702 
"assigns to trial judges a 'gatekeeper ' responsibility to 
screen out unreliable expert testimony"-not just scientific 
expert testimony. When applying the new rule 702, judges 
should approach expert testimony with "rational skepticism." 
But the "degree of scrutiny [that should be applied to expert 
testimony by trial judges] is not so rigorous as to be 
satisfied only by scientific or other specialized principles 
or methods that are free of controversy or that meet any fixed 
set of criteria fashioned to test reliability . n Importantly , 
? 1 O _. 
WIMMER V. PANDITA PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
both subsections (b) and (c) require the plaintiff to make 
only a "threshold showing11 of reliability . 
Id. (internal citations omitted) 
While the plaintiff concedes that Dr. Smith's opinions are not "free 
of controversy," she argues that Dr. Smith nevert heless meets the 
threshold showing of reliability . The Court disagrees and concludes 
instead that Dr. Smith's theories have been largely re j ected both by the 
economics community and in jurisprudence. 
Dr. Pandita ' s moving papers discuss various economists who have 
reviewed Dr. Smith's opinions and his attempts to value the lost 
enjoyment of life for purposes of litigation . These com_mentaries speak 
to Dr. Smith's "misuse" of principles concerning the value of statistical 
life and conclude that his application of such principles in the present 
type of context "falls outside of the parameters of 'reasonable 
probability. 111 See e.g. Affidavit of John 0. Ward , Ph. D. 
In addition, Dr . Pandita cites a number of legal opinions where Dr. 
Smit h ' s value of life testimony was excluded. Wh ile the plaintiff 
suggests a trend towards acceptance of Dr. Smith's opinions, the Court 
finds no evidence of this . To the contrary, the isolated cases relied 
on by the plaintiff are either inapplicable in a wrongful death case or 
are no longer good case law. 
After considering the foregoing, the Court determines that Dr. 



















WIMMER V . PANDITA PAGE 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
are fundamentally subjective and are inherently unreliable. The plaintiff 
has not met t h e threshold burden of showing the reliability of the 
principles that form the basis for Dr. Smith 's testimony and the 
re l iability of applying those principles to the facts of this case . 
Accordingly, exercising the gatekeeper responsibilities discussed in 
Eskelson, this Court concludes that Dr . Smith's loss of enjoyment of life 
opinions must be excluded at trial . Accordingly, Dr. Pandita's Motion 
to Preclude Smith's testimony is granted both for the reasons set forth 
herein and on the grounds detailed in Dr . Pandita's· Motion. 
Next, the Court grants the defendants' Motions with respect to Dr. 
Landers. The Court concludes that Dr. Landers' testimony is not proper 
rebuttal testimony and is cumulative of plaintiff's other experts . 
Foremost, Dr. Landers' testimony does not refute any new points or 
evidence offered by the defendants or their experts, but rather is 
cumulative of opinions offered by the plaintiff's other experts, 
including Drs . Ali and Ginsberg . The plaintiff argues that the 
defendants , in presenting their case, will i ntroduce new evidence to the 
jury, which will therefore allow Dr . Landers to prop erly testify as a 
rebuttal witnes s . However, while the evidence discussed at the hearing 
may be new to the jury, it will not be unanticipated . 
Accordingly, the Court grants the defendants' Motions and strikes 
Dr. Landers as a rebuttal expert witness . 
• 
• 
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This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
/ 
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Oral Argument 3/1 8/2014 
plaintiff . That ' s a reasonable inference . Well , no , 
they don ' t get to speculate that way . That ' s wrong . 
And we can either have that established now or we can 
establish that in some other forum . But to say that , 
oh , you don ' t get to speculate but the law clearl y say 
you must indulge- -
THE COURT : Are you listening to what your 
argument is? 
MR . PRITCHETT : Yes . 
THE COURT : Do you- -
MR . PRITCHETT : What would the Court like to 
say? 
THE COURT : Well , I just wonder if you 
realize how of f ensive you are to the Court ? 
MR . PRITCHETT : Well , I don ' t know how we can 
talk about an error without saying that it was wrong . 
THE COURT : You can say there was - -we ' re 
claiming that there was an error . 
MR . PRITCHETT : Okay . 
THE COURT : We could have th i s addressed now 
or , if we need to , we can see if there was an error 
confirmed on appeal . But this is an in- your- face 
argument , and i t ' s not being taken very well by this 
Court . I ' m indulging it. I ' ll take it . But I ' m 
telling you , you're out of order and you ' re offensive 
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and you don't need to be. Because you'd be a lot more 
persuasive if you would argue in a more civil, 
controlled and less in-your-face manner. That would be 
less offensive to the Court. But the way you're 
presenting it, it's like--the Court's either going to 
just be shamed into adopting your--or it will dig in 
its heels and say to heck with you. I don't care how 
good your argument is. I'm not going to do that, but 
that's the initial response. 
Okay. Go ahead. I'm through giving my 
mentoring. 
MR. PRITCHETT: Okay. 
The way that I would like to approach the 
argument is from what I think are fairly clearly 
established principles. Where it takes us off turn is 
in the grey areas--but if people can agree on the 
fundamental propositions and reason from there, 
oftentimes parties can arrive at an agreed end point. 
And I think that there hasn't been any dispute from the 
other side as to what the proper standard for a grant 
of directed verdict is. And that is that in order to 
grant a directed verdict all reasonable inferences must 
be indulged in favor of the plaintiff. And the problem 
with the argument that's going on in court right now is 
they're saying, well, they're just speculating and that 
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provides the reasonable inference that the jury could 
determine the fact of damages from . 
THE COURT : Let me ask you a question. 
MR . PRITCHETT : Okay . 
THE COURT : If you take every fact that I can 
think of to be the same in a hypothetical . So we have 
a parent and a child living together , and that child 
has been nothing but a source of frustration , expense, 
anger and heartbreak to t hat parent . And then that 
child is put in the hospital through the fault of 
somebody else ' s . And the parent goes to the hospital . 
And , in fact , because the child had nowhere else to 
live , the child was consigned to a basement room at the j 
far end of the house and said , "Here's key , here ' s your 
your entrance , but I don ' t want to see you in the 
house . I don ' t want to see you upstairs . Not in the 
kitchen . Not in the bedroom . You have a bedroom and 
that ' s it ." And now this child who has been strung out 
on dope and drugs and crime for 25 years is now in the 
hospital, the victim of some wrongful act . And the 
parent goes to the hospital and says , you know , 
"Son/daughter , son , don ' t die . I really do love you . " 
And what is that? I mean , what is a jury to do wi t h 
that , if anything? 
MR . PRITCHETT : Well , I think--
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because there was none of that, the fact of damages was 4 j 
not proven. That's a backwards reasoning. That's 
flawed reasoning that should not stand. 
I'd like to point out to the Court that no 
case was cited in this courtroom on the record during 
this argument making any distinction between the 
benefit and the burden of people living with each 
other. That case has not been cited to the Court. 
There are a couple--
THE COURT: So let me follow up on that. 
MR. PRITCHETT: Sure. 
THE COURT: I agree there's no case, but in 
the Court's hypothetical--we'll do one other bit here. 
The other parent wasn't sad to lose a child. He was 
actually quite relieved. Relieved for themselves, 
relieved for the child; the pain and suffering was 
gone. The anxious nights, the wasted years, the stress 
are all--you know, there will be no more of that. 
MR. PRITCHETT: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Thanks for dying. It hurts. I'm 
sad. But it's the best result for everybody. So now 
we're getting back to the jury for wrongful death and 
there's no positive inference at all. I mean there's 
nothing positive in this relationship. All the jury 
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what you said , he lived in your basement and you cried 
and wiped his brow and we think that that ' s sufficient 
to show a good , positive relationship and so we will 
consider damage. And then they did damage and mom and 
dad walk out with crocodile tears and all this money 
that they thought , are you kidding me? I mean , we ' re 
glad he ' s gone . What ' s this ? 
MR. PRITCHETT : Okay . But I think in the 
Court 's hypothetical we' re talking about the inference 
drawn from the evidence ; that the inferences could be 
drawn one way or the other . 
THE COURT: That ' s my point . 
MR . PRITCHETT : Am I understanding? 
THE COURT: That ' s my poi nt . 
MR . PRITCHETT : Okay . 
THE COURT : What ' s a jury to know based on 
the same evidence? 
MR . PRITCHETT : And that's a question that 
the courts have wrestled with before . The case of 
Gorden v . Sharon ' s Cultural Education and Recreational 
Associati on ta lks about that . They say in there- - this-
- the cite for this- - this wasn ' t cited to the Court in 
the brie fing but it ' s a case that I brought because I 
thought that there might be some discussion about this 
subject . It 's Gorden v . Sharon ' s Cultura l Education 
.. -
.... ·-· -
- -- ·- - -
. -
50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
A--11 
THACKE~ ..,0 
Page 38 
l 
I 
,l 
~ 
: 
I 
l 
1 
l 
! j 
